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ABSTRACT
In today’s Internet, with the advent of cloud computing, there is a natural desire for enter-
prises, organizations, and end users to outsource increasingly large amounts of data to a
cloud provider. Therefore, ensuring security and privacy is becoming a significant challenge
for cloud computing, especially for users with sensitive and valuable data. Recently, many
efficient and scalable query processing methods over encrypted data have been proposed.
Despite that, numerous challenges remain to be addressed due to the high complexity of
many important queries on encrypted large-scale datasets. This thesis studies the problem
of privacy-preserving database query processing on structured data (e.g., relational and
graph databases). In particular, this thesis proposes several practical and provable secure
structured encryption schemes that allow the data owner to encrypt data without losing
the ability to query and retrieve it efficiently for authorized clients. This thesis includes
two parts. The first part investigates graph encryption schemes. This thesis proposes a
graph encryption scheme for approximate shortest distance queries. Such scheme allows
the client to query the shortest distance between two nodes in an encrypted graph securely
and efficiently. Moreover, this thesis also explores how the techniques can be applied to
other graph queries. The second part of this thesis proposes secure top-k query processing
schemes on encrypted relational databases. Furthermore, the thesis develops a scheme for
the top-k join queries over multiple encrypted relations. Finally, this thesis demonstrates
the practicality of the proposed encryption schemes by prototyping the encryption systems
to perform queries on real-world encrypted datasets.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As remote storage and cloud computing services emerge, such as Amazon’s EC2, Google
AppEngine, and Microsoft’s Azure, many enterprises, organizations, and end users may
outsource their data to those cloud service providers for reliable maintenance, lower cost,
and better performance. In fact, a number of database systems on the cloud have been
developed recently that offer high availability and flexibility at relatively low costs.
However, despite these benefits, there are still a number of reasons that make many
users to refrain from using these services, especially users with sensitive and valuable
data. Undoubtedly, the main issue for this is related to security and privacy con-
cerns [Agrawal et al., 2011]. Indeed, data owner and clients may not fully trust a public
cloud since the hackers, or the cloud’s administrators with root privilege can fully access all
data for any purpose. Sometimes the cloud provider may sell its business to an untrusted
company, which will have full access to the data. Therefore, ensuring security and privacy
is becoming a significant challenge for cloud computing, especially for users with sensitive
and valuable data. In addition, the benefits of big data - including advances in machine
learning, e-commerce, social sciences, and marketing - are well-publicized, but the various
privacy and security problems it presents have received less attention from the public at
large.
One approach to address these issues is to encrypt the data before outsourcing them
to the cloud. For example, electronic health records (EHRs) should be encrypted before
outsourcing in compliance with regulations like HIPAA1. Encrypted data can bring an en-
1HIPAA is the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
2hanced security into the Database-As-Service environment [Hacigu¨mu¨s et al., 2002]. How-
ever, it also introduces significant difficulties in querying and computing over these data.
In recent years, many works have been proposed for computing over encrypted data. In
general, the main technical difficulty is to query an encrypted database without ever having
to decrypt it. A number of techniques related to practical query processing over encrypted
data have been proposed recently, including keyword search queries [Song et al., 2000,
Cash et al., 2013b, Curtmola et al., 2011], range queries [Shi et al., 2007, Hore et al., 2012,
Li et al., 2014], k-nearest neighbor queries [Wong et al., 2009, Elmehdwi et al., 2014,
Yao et al., 2013, Choi et al., 2014], as well as other aggregate queries.
This thesis proposes practical and scalable encryption schemes for a number of impor-
tant database queries. All of the encryption schemes are practical and provably secure.
In particular, these encryption schemes allow the data owner to encrypt data without
losing the ability to query and retrieve it efficiently for authorized clients. This thesis
mainly focuses on two different type of real-world databases: graph databases and rela-
tional databases.
The first part of this thesis focuses on the problem of designing graph encryption
schemes that support one of the most fundamental and important graph operations: find-
ing the shortest distance between two nodes. Shortest distance queries are a basic operation
in many graph algorithms but also have applications of their own. For instance, on a social
network, shortest distance queries return the shortest number of introductions necessary
for one person to meet another. In protein-protein interaction networks they can be used
to find the functional correlations among proteins [Przulj et al., 2004] and on a phone call
graph (i.e., a graph that consists of phone numbers as vertices and calls as edges) they re-
turn the shortest number of calls connecting two nodes. The thesis develops graph encryp-
tion schemes that efficiently support approximate shortest distance queries on large-scale
encrypted graphs. Shortest distance queries are one of the most fundamental graph opera-
tions and have a wide range of applications. Using such graph encryption schemes, a client
can outsource large-scale privacy-sensitive graphs to an untrusted server without losing the
3ability to query it. Other applications include encrypted graph databases and controlled
disclosure systems. In particular, the thesis proposes GRECS (stands for GRaph En-
Cryption for approximate Shortest distance queries) which includes three schemes that are
provably secure against any semi-honest server. Furthermore, this thesis also shows that
the building blocks in GRECS can be used for other graph queries.
The second part focuses on relational databases. In particular, this thesis proposes se-
cure and efficient processing protocols of top-k queries over outsourced relational databases
under the non-colluding semi-honest clouds model. The thesis also formulates and con-
structs several novel secure sub-protocols, such as secure best/worst score and secure de-
duplication, which can be adapted as stand-alone building blocks for many other applica-
tions. In particular, during the querying phase the computation performed by the client is
very small. The client only needs to compute a simple token for the server and all of the
relatively heavier computations are performed by the cloud side. The schemes are imple-
mented and have been demonstrated to be very efficient by running a set of experiments
on a number of real-world databases. Furthermore, the thesis shows that the techniques
can be adopted for handling top-k join on multiple encrypted databases, as well as general
join queries.
Contributions. To summarize, the contributions of this thesis are listed below:
• This thesis proposes three graph encryption schemes for approximate shortest dis-
tance queries (GRECS). In particular,
– The first scheme only makes use of symmetric-key operations and, as such, is
computationally-efficient.
– The second scheme makes use of somewhat-homomorphic encryption and
achieves optimal communication complexity.
– The third scheme is computationally-efficient, achieves optimal communication
complexity and produces compact encrypted oracles at the cost of some extra
4leakage.
• All of the proposed constructions are adaptively semantically-secure with reasonable
leakage functions.
• The encryption schemes are implemented and evaluated over real large-scale graphs
and it is demonstrated that the constructions are practical and scalable.
• The thesis proposes a new practical protocol designed to answer top-k queries over
encrypted relational databases.
• The thesis proposes two encrypted data structures called EHL and EHL+ which allow
the servers to homomorphically evaluate the equality relations between two objects.
• The thesis proposes several independent sub-protocols such that the cloud can se-
curely computes the best/worst scores and de-duplicate replicated encrypted objects
with the use of another non-colluding server. These protocols are building blocks
when computing the top-k queries.
• The thesis proposes schemes for secure top-k join queries and generic join queries.
• All of the schemes are experimentally evaluated using real-world datasets and result
shows that the scheme is efficient and practical.
The thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces the preliminaries and notation we used.
• Chapter 3 proposes GRECS which includes three schemes. This chapter first discusses
the formal security definitions for the graph encryption scheme and distance oracle
data structures. It then describes the three schemes in details and demonstrates the
experimental results. In addition, it also briefly introduces other graph queries on
encrypted graphs.
5• Chapter 4 discusses secure top-k query processing on encrypted relations and de-
scribes the scheme in detail. This chapter also proposes the top-k join query process-
ing on multiple encrypted relations, and briefly introduces the protocol for generic
secure join queries.
• Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Notation and Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Let S be a set, then |S| refers to its cardinality. The notation {Ii} represents a set of
items with the same form of the item Ii. The notation [n] represents the set of integers
{1, . . . , n}. We write x ← χ to represent an element x being sampled from a distribution
χ. We write x
$←− X to represent an element x being uniformly sampled at random from
a set X. The output x of a probabilistic algorithm A is denoted by x ← A and that
of a deterministic algorithm B by x := B. Given a sequence of elements v, we define
its ith element either as vi or v[i] and its total number of elements as |v|. Throughout,
λ ∈ N will denote the security parameter and we assume all algorithms take λ implicitly
as input. A function ν : N → N is negligible in λ if for every positive polynomial p(·)
and all sufficiently large λ, ν(λ) < 1/p(λ). We write f(λ) = poly(λ) to mean that there
exists a polynomial p(·) such that f(λ) ≤ p(λ) for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N; and we
similarly write f(λ) = negl(λ) to mean that there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that
f(λ) ≤ ν(λ) for all sufficiently large λ. A dictionary DX is a data structure that stores
label/value pairs (`i, vi)
n
i=1. Dictionaries support insert and lookup operations defined as
follows: an insert operation takes as input a dictionary DX and a label/value pair (`, v) and
adds the pair to DX. We denote this as DX[`] := v. A lookup operation takes as input a
dictionary DX a label `i and returns the associated value vi. We denote this as vi := DX[`i].
Dictionaries can be instantiated using hash tables and various kinds of search trees. Given
an undirected graph G = (V,E), we denote its total number of nodes as n = |V | and its
7number of edges as m = |E|. A shortest distance query q = (u, v) asks for the length of
the shortest path between u and v which we denote dist(u, v).
2.2 Cryptographic Tools
2.2.1 Encryption
In this work, we make use of several kinds of encryption schemes including standard
symmetric-key encryption and homomorphic encryption. A symmetric-key encryption
scheme SKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a set of three polynomial-time algorithms that work
as follows. Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input
and returns a secret key K; Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a key K
and a message m and returns a ciphertext c; Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes
as input a key K and a ciphertext c and returns m if K was the key under which c was
produced. A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is similarly defined ex-
cept that Gen outputs a public/private key pair (pk, sk) and Enc encrypts messages with
the public key pk. Informally, an encryption scheme is CPA-secure (Chosen-Plaintext-
Attack-secure) if the ciphertexts it outputs do not reveal any partial information about the
messages even to an adversary that can adaptively query an encryption oracle. We refer
the reader to [Katz and Lindell, 2008] for formal definitions of symmetric-key encryption
and CPA-security.
A public-key encryption scheme SWHE is homomorphic if, in addition to the three al-
gorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec), it also includes an evaluation algorithm Eval that takes as input a
function f and a set of ciphertexts c1 ← SWHE.Encpk(m1) through cn ← SWHE.Encpk(mn)
and returns a ciphertext c such that Decsk(c) = f(m1, . . . ,mn). If a homomorphic en-
cryption scheme supports the evaluation of any polynomial-time function, then it is a
fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [Rivest et al., 1978, Gentry, 2009b] other-
wise it is a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme. In this dissertation,
we make use of only “low degree” homomorphic encryption. In particular, in Chap-
8ter 3, we require the encryption scheme support the evaluation of quadratic polynomi-
als, In particular, we need the evaluation algorithm to support any number of additions:
SWHE.Encpk(m1 + m2) = SWHE.Eval
(
+,Encpk(m1),Encpk(m2)
)
; and a single multiplica-
tion: SWHE.Encpk(m1 ·m2) = SWHE.Eval(×,Encpk(m1),Encpk(m2)), that is, a ciphertext
that results from a homomorphic multiplication cannot be used in another homomorphic
multiplication. Concrete instantiations of such schemes include the scheme of Boneh, Goh
and Nissim (BGN) [Boneh et al., 2005] based on bilinear maps and the scheme of Gentry,
Halevi and Vaikuntanathan [Gentry et al., 2010] based on lattices. In Chapter 4, as we
only require the encryption scheme to be additively homomorphic, we choose the Paillier
encryption scheme. Below we describe the two encryption schemes, Paillier encryption and
Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption.
Paillier Crypotsystem The Paillier cryptosystem is a semantically secure public key en-
cryption scheme based on the Decisional Composite Residuosity assumption. More specif-
ically, the Paillier cryptosystem is defined as follows:
• Key Generation. To construct the public key, set an RSA modulus n = pq of k bits where
p and q large primes such that gcd(pq, (p−1)(q−1)) = 1. Let K = lcm((p−1)(q−1))
and pick generator g ∈ Z∗n. The public key is the pair pk = (n, g) and the secret is
sk = K.
• Encryption. To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn: choose r $←− Z∗n and compute Encpk(m) =
gmrn mod n2.
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext c = Enc(m) compute:
m =
L(csk) mod n2
L(gsk) mod n2
mod n, whereL(u) =
u− 1
n
Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) Crypotsystem The cryptosystem devised by Boneh,
Goh, and Nissim [Boneh et al., 2005] was the first to allow both additions and multiplica-
9tions with a constant-size ciphertext. The encryption uses pairings on elliptic curves. The
scheme makes use of certain finite groups of composite order that support a bilinear map.
We use the following notation
• G and G1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of finite order n.
• g is a generator of G.
• e is a bilinear map e : G×G→ G1. In other words, for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, we
have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab. We also require that e(g, g) is a generator of G1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if there exists a group G1 and a bilinear map as above.
In the next section we also add the requirement that the group action in G, G1, and the
bilinear map can be computed in polynomial time. We refer to [Boneh et al., 2005] on how
to generate the public parameters (q1, q2, G,G1, e), where q1 and q2 are two primes with
k-bit. We now describe the three key algorithm that makes up the system:
• Key Generation. Generate the parameters (q1, q2, G,G1, e) as described in
[Boneh et al., 2005], where q1 and q2 are two primes with k-bit. Let n = q1q2. Pick
two random generators g, u
$←− G and set h = uq2. Then h is a random generator of
the subgroup of G of order q1. The public key is pk = (n,G,G1, e, g, h). The private
key is sk = q1.
• Encryption. We assume the message space consists of integers in the set {0, 1, ..., T} with
T < q2. To encrypt a message m: choose r
$←− Zn and compute Encpk(m) = gmhr
mod n2.
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext C using the private key sk = q1, observe that
Cq1 = (gmhr)q1 = (gq1)m
Let g′ = gq1 . To recover m, it suffices to compute the discrete log of Cq1 base g′.
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Since 0 ≤ m ≤ T this takes expected time O˜(√T ) using Pollards lambda method
(see [Menezes et al., 1996], p.128).
2.2.2 Pseudo-random functions
A pseudo-random function (PRF) from domain D to co-domain R is a function family
that is computationally indistinguishable from a random function. In other words, no
computationally-bounded adversary can distinguish between oracle access to a function
that is chosen uniformly at random in the family and oracle access to a function chosen
uniformly at random from the space of all functions from D to R . A pseudo-random
permutation (PRP) is a pseudo-random family of permutations over D. We refer the
reader to [Katz and Lindell, 2008] for formal definitions of PRFs and PRPs.
Chapter 3
Graph Encryption for Approximate Shortest
Distance Queries
3.1 Graph Encryption
Graph databases that store, manage, and query large graphs have received increased inter-
est recently due to many large-scale database applications that can be modeled as graph
problems. Example applications include storing and querying large Web graphs, online
social networks, biological networks, RDF datasets, and communication networks. As a re-
sult, a number of systems have been proposed to manage, query, and analyze massive graphs
both in academia (e.g., Pregel [Malewicz et al., 2010], GraphLab [Low et al., 2010], Hor-
ton [Sarwat et al., 2012], Trinity [Shao et al., 2013], TurboGraph [Han et al., 2013], and
GraphChi-DB [Kyrola and Guestrin, 2014]) and industry (e.g., Neo4j, Titan, DEX, and
GraphBase). Furthermore, with the advent of cloud computing, there is a natural desire
for enterprises and startups to outsource the storage and management of their databases
to a cloud provider. Like any large-scale database, as cloud computing has emerged as
important infrastructure, a lot of graph dataset has been outsourced to the cloud provider
from the user/client. Graph database contains very sensitive information about the entities
in the graph, therefore, one would like to protect those information against the adversarial
cloud service provider. Increasing concerns about data security and privacy in the cloud,
however, have curbed many data owners’ enthusiasm about storing their databases in the
cloud.
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To address this, Chase and Kamara [Chase and Kamara, 2010] introduced the notion
of graph encryption. Roughly speaking, a graph encryption scheme encrypts a graph in
such a way that it can be privately queried. Using such a scheme, an organization can
safely outsource its encrypted graph to an untrusted cloud provider without losing the
ability to query it. Several constructions were described in [Chase and Kamara, 2010]
including schemes that support adjacency queries (i.e., given two nodes, do they have
an edge in common?), neighbor queries (i.e., given a node, return all its neighbors)
and focused subgraph queries on web graphs (a complex query used to do ranked
web searches). Graph encryption is a special case of structured encryption, which
are schemes that encrypt data structures in such a way that they can be privately
queried. The most well-studied class of structured encryption schemes are searchable
symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes [Song et al., 2000, Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005,
Goh, 2003, Curtmola et al., 2006, Kamara et al., 2012, Kamara and Papamanthou, 2013,
Cash et al., 2013a, Cash et al., 2014, Naveed et al., 2014, Stefanov et al., 2014] which,
roughly speaking, encrypt search structures (e.g., indexes or search trees) for the purpose
of efficiently searching on encrypted data.
In this work, we focus on the problem of designing graph encryption schemes that
support one of the most fundamental and important graph operations: finding the shortest
distance between two nodes. Shortest distance queries are a basic operation in many graph
algorithms but also have applications of their own. For instance, on a social network,
shortest distance queries return the shortest number of introductions necessary for one
person to meet another. In protein-protein interaction networks they can be used to find
the functional correlations among proteins [Przulj et al., 2004] and on a phone call graph
(i.e., a graph that consists of phone numbers as vertices and calls as edges) they return the
shortest number of calls connecting two nodes.
The techniques Computing shortest distance queries on massive graphs (e.g., the
Web graph, online social networks or a country’s call graph) can be very expensive.
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For example, it takes O(|E| + |V | log |V |)to compute the shortest distance using Di-
jkstra’s algorithm. Therefore, in practice, one typically pre-computes a data struc-
ture from the graph called a distance oracle that answers shortest distance queries ap-
proximately [Thorup and Zwick, 2005, Das Sarma et al., 2010, Cohen et al., 2013]; that
is, given two vertices v1 and v2, the structure returns a distance d that is at most
α · dist(v1, v2) + β, where α, β > 1 and dist(v1, v2) is the exact distance between v1 and v2.
In this work, we focus on designing structured encryption schemes for a certain class of
distance oracles referred to as sketch-based oracles. Below we summarize our contributions:
• We propose three distance oracle encryption schemes. Our first scheme only makes
use of symmetric-key operations and, as such, is very computationally-efficient. Our
second scheme makes use of somewhat-homomorphic encryption and achieves optimal
communication complexity. Our third scheme is computationally-efficient, achieves
optimal communication complexity and produces compact encrypted oracles at the
cost of some leakage.
• We show that all our constructions are adaptively semantically-secure with reasonable
leakage functions.
• We implement and evaluate our solutions on real large-scale graphs and show that
our constructions are practical.
3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 Graph privacy
Privacy-preserving graph processing has been considered in the past. Most of the work
in this area, however, focuses on privacy models that are different than ours. Some of
the proposed approaches include structural anonymization to protect neighborhood in-
formation [Gao et al., 2011, Liu and Terzi, 2008, Cheng et al., 2010], use differential pri-
vacy [Dwork et al., 2006] to query graph statistics privately [Kasiviswanathan et al., 2013,
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Shen and Yu, 2013], or use private information retrieval (PIR) [Mouratidis and Yiu, 2012]
to privately recover shortest paths. We note that none of these approaches are appropri-
ate in our context where the graph itself stores sensitive information (and therefore must
be hidden unlike in the PIR scenario) and is stored remotely (unlike the differential pri-
vacy and anonymization scenarios). Structured and graph encryption was introduced by
Chase and Kamara in [Chase and Kamara, 2010]. Structured encryption is a generaliza-
tion of searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) which was first proposed by Song, Wagner
and Perrig [Song et al., 2000]. The notion of adaptive semantic security was introduced
by Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky in [Curtmola et al., 2006] and generalized to
the setting of structured encryption in [Chase and Kamara, 2010]. One could also encrypt
and outsource the graph using fully homomorphic encryption [Gentry, 2009b], which sup-
ports arbitrary computations on encrypted data, but this would be prohibitively slow in
practice. Another approach is to execute graph algorithms over encrypted and outsourced
graphs is to use Oblivious RAM [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] over the adjacency ma-
trix of the graph. This approach, however, is inefficient and not practical even for small
graphs since it requires storage that is quadratic in the number of nodes in the graph
and a large number of costly oblivious operations. Recent work by [Wang et al., 2014]
presents an oblivious data structure for computing shortest paths on planar graphs us-
ing ORAM. For a sparse planar graph with O(n) edges, their approach requires O(n1.5)
space complexity at the cost of O(
√
n log n) online query time. Recent works based on
ORAM, such as [Liu et al., 2014, Liu et al., 2015b], also propose oblivious secure compu-
tation frameworks that can be used to compute single source shortest paths. However, these
are general purpose frameworks and are not optimized to answer shortest distance queries.
Note that these works solve more generic problems on oblivious secure computation rather
than just shortest path distance queries. Other techniques, such as those developed by
Blanton, Steele and Aliasgari [Blanton et al., 2013] and by Aly et al. [Aly et al., 2013] do
not seem to scale to sparse graphs with millions of nodes due to the quadratic complexity
of the underlying operations which are instantiated with secure multi-party computation
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protocols.
3.2.2 Distance oracles
Computing shortest distances on large graphs using Dijkstra’s algorithm or breadth first
search is very expensive. Alternatively, it is not practical to store all-pairs-shortest-
distances since it requires O(n2) space for n nodes. To address this, in practice,
one pre-computes a data structure called a distance oracle that supports approximate
shortest distance queries between two nodes with logarithmic query time. Solutions
such as [Das Sarma et al., 2010, Potamias et al., 2009, Qi et al., 2013, Cohen et al., 2013,
Chechik, 2014, Cohen, 2014, Cohen et al., 2003] carefully select seed nodes (also known as
landmarks) and store the shortest distances from all the nodes to the seeds. The advantage
of using such a data structure is that they are compact and the query time is very fast. For
example, the distance oracle construction of Das Sarma, Gollapudi, Najork and Panigrahy
[Das Sarma et al., 2010] requires O˜(n1/c) work to return a (2c − 1)-approximation of the
shortest distance for some constant c.
3.3 Distance Oracles for Shortest Distance Computation
At a high-level, our approach to designing graph encryption schemes for shortest distance
queries consists of encrypting a distance oracle in such a way that it can be queried privately.
A distance oracle is a data structure that supports approximate shortest distance queries. A
trivial construction consists of pre-computing and storing all the pairwise shortest distances
between nodes in the graph. The query complexity of such a solution is O(1) but the storage
complexity is O(n2) which is not practical for large graphs.
We consider two practical distance oracle constructions. Both solutions are sketch-
based which means that they assign a sketch Skv to each node v ∈ V in such a way
that the approximate distance between two nodes u and v can be efficiently (sublinear)
computed from the sketches Sku and Skv. The first construction is by Das Sarma et
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al. [Das Sarma et al., 2010] which is itself based on a construction of Thorup and Zwick
[Thorup and Zwick, 2005] and the second is by Cohen et al. [Cohen et al., 2013]. The two
solutions produce sketches of the same form and distance queries are answered using the
same operation.
3.3.1 Sketch-based oracles.
More formally, a sketch-based distance oracle DO = (Setup,Query) is a pair of efficient
algorithms that work as follows. Setup takes as input a graph G, an approximation factor
α and an error bound ε and outputs an oracle ΩG = {Skv}v∈V . Query takes as input an
oracle ΩG and a shortest distance query q = (u, v). We say that DO is (α, ε)-correct if for
all graphs G and all queries q = (u, v), Pr [ dist(u, v) ≤ d ≤ α · dist(u, v) ] ≥ 1 − ε, where
d := Query(ΩG, u, v). The probability is over the randomness of algorithm Setup.
3.3.2 The Das Sarma et al. oracle.
The Setup algorithm makes σ = Θ˜(n2/(α+1)) calls to a Sketch sub-routine with the graph
G. Throughout, we refer to σ as the oracle’s sampling parameter and we note that it affects
the size of the sketches. During the ith call, the Sketch routine generates and returns a
collection of sketches (Skiv1 , . . . ,Sk
i
vn), one for every node vj ∈ V . Each sketch Skivj is a
set constructed as follows. During the ith call to Sketch, it samples uniformly at random
ζ = log n sets of nodes S0, . . . , Sζ−1 of progressively larger sizes. In particular, for all
0 ≤ z ≤ ζ − 1, set Sz is of size 2z. Skivj then consists of ζ pairs {(wz, δz)}0≤z≤ζ−1 such that
wz is the closest node to vj among the nodes in Sz and δz = dist(vj , wz). Having computed
σ collections of sketches (Skiv1 , . . . ,Sk
i
vn)i∈[σ], Setup then generates, for each node vj ∈ V , a
final sketch Skvj =
⋃σ
i=1 Sk
i
vj . Finally, it outputs a distance oracle ΩG = (Skv1 , . . . ,Skvn).
Throughout, we refer to the uniformly sampled nodes stored in the node/distance pairs of
the sketches as seeds.
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3.3.3 The Cohen et al. oracle
The Setup algorithm assigns to each node v ∈ V a sketch Skv that includes pairs (w, δ)
chosen as follows. It first chooses a random rank function rk : V → [0, 1]; that is, a function
that assigns to each v ∈ V a value distributed uniformly at random from [0, 1]. Let Nd(v)
be the set of nodes within distance d − 1 of v and let ρ = Θ(n2/(α+1)). Throughout, we
refer to ρ as the oracle’s rank parameter and note that it affects the size of the sketches.
For each node v ∈ V , the sketch Skv includes pairs (w, δ) such that rk(w) is less than the
ρth value in the sorted set {rk(y) : y ∈ Ndist(u,v)(v)}. Finally it outputs a distance oracle
ΩG = (Skv1 , . . . ,Skvn). Like above, we refer to the nodes stored in the node/distance pairs
of the sketches as seeds.
3.3.4 Shortest distance queries
The two oracle constructions share the same Query algorithm which works as follows. Given
a query q = (u, v), it finds the set of nodes I in common between Sku and Skv and returns
the minimum over s ∈ I of dist(u, s) + dist(s, v). If there are no nodes in common, then it
returns ⊥.
Sk(u): {(a, 3), (b, 3), (e, 6), (g, 3), (h, 4)}
Sk(v): {(b, 2), (d, 1), (e, 3), (h, 3), (f, 7)}
Figure 3.1: Two sketches for nodes u and v. The approximate shortest distance d = 5.
3.4 Distance Oracle Encryption
In this section we present the syntax and security definition for our oracle encryption
schemes. There are many variants of structured encryption, including interactive and non-
interactive, response-revealing and response-hiding. We consider interactive and response-
hiding schemes which denote the fact that the scheme’s query operation requires at least
two messages (one from client and a response from server) and that queries output no
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information to the server.
Definition 3.4.1 (Oracle Encryption). A distance oracle encryption scheme Graph =
(Setup, distQuery) consists of a polynomial-time algorithm and a polynomial-time two-party
protocol that work as follows:
• (K,EO)← Setup(1λ,Ω, α, ε): is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter λ, a distance oracle Ω, an approximation factor α, and an error parameter
ε. It outputs a secret key K and an encrypted oracle EO.
• (d,⊥) ← distQueryC,S
(
(K, q),EO
)
: is a two-party protocol between a client C that
holds a key K and a shortest distance query q = (u, v) ∈ V 2 and a server S that
holds an encrypted oracle EO. After executing the protocol, the client receives a
distance d ≥ 0 and the server receives ⊥. We sometimes omit the subscripts C and
S when the parties are clear from the context.
For α ≥ 1 and ε < 1, we say that Graph is (α, ε)-correct if for all k ∈ N, for all Ω and for
all q = (u, v) ∈ V 2,
Pr [ d ≤ α · dist(u, v) ] ≥ 1− ε,
where the probability is over the randomness in computing (K,EO) ← Setup(1λ,Ω, α, ε)
and then (d,⊥)← distQuery((K, q),EO).
3.4.1 Security
At a high level, the security guarantee we require from an oracle encryption scheme is
that: (1) given an encrypted oracle, no adversary can learn any information about the
underlying oracle; and (2) given the view of a polynomial number of distQuery executions
for an adaptively generated sequence of queries q = (q1, . . . , qn), no adversary can learn
any partial information about either ΩG or q.
Such a security notion can be difficult to achieve efficiently, so often one allows for
some form of leakage. Following [Curtmola et al., 2006, Chase and Kamara, 2010], this
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is usually formalized by parameterizing the security definition with leakage functions for
each operation of the scheme which in this case include the Setup algorithm and distQuery
protocol.
We adapt the notion of adaptive semantic security from [Curtmola et al., 2006,
Chase and Kamara, 2010] to our setting to the case of distance oracle encryption.
Definition 3.4.2. Let Graph = (Setup, distQuery) be an oracle encryption scheme and
consider the following probabilistic experiments where A is a semi-honest adversary, C is
a challenger, S is a simulator and LSetup and LQuery are (stateful) leakage functions:
IdealA,S(1λ):
• A outputs an oracle Ω, its approximation factor α and its error parameter ε.
• Given LSetup(Ω), 1λ, α and ε, S generates and sends an encrypted graph EO to A.
• A generates a polynomial number of adaptively chosen queries (q1, . . . , qm). For each
qi, S is given LQuery(Ω, qi) and A and S execute a simulation of distQuery with A
playing the role of the server and S playing the role of the client.
• A computes a bit b that is output by the experiment.
RealA(1λ):
• A outputs an oracle Ω, its approximation factor α and its error parameter ε.
• C computes (K,EO)← Setup(1λ,Ω, α, ε) and sends the encrypted graph EO to A.
• A generates a polynomial number of adaptively chosen queries (q1, . . . , qm). For each
query qi, A and C execute distQueryC,A
(
(K, q),EO
)
.
• A computes a bit b that is output by the experiment.
We say that Graph is adaptively (LSetup,LQuery)-semantically secure if for all ppt ad-
versaries A, there exists a ppt simulator S such that
∣∣∣Pr [RealA(1λ) = 1]− Pr [IdealA,S(1λ)] = 1∣∣∣ = negl(k).
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The definition above captures the fact that, given the encrypted oracle and its view of
the query protocol, an adversarial server cannot learn any information about the oracle
beyond the leakage.
3.4.2 Leakage
All the distance oracle encryption schemes we discuss in this work leak information. We
describe and formalize these leakages below.
3.4.2.1 Setup leakage
The setup leakage of our first and second constructions, GraphEnc1 and GraphEnc2 in
Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3, includes the total number of nodes in the underlying graph n,
the maximum sketch size S = maxv∈V |Skv| and the maximum distance over all seeds
D = maxv∈V max(w,δ)∈Skv δ. The setup leakage of our third construction, GraphEnc3 in
Section 3.5.5, includes n, S, D and the total number of seeds Z =
∑
v∈V |Skv|.
3.4.2.2 Query pattern leakage
The query leakage of our first two constructions, GraphEnc1 and GraphEnc2, reveals whether
the nodes in the query have appeared before. We refer to this as the query pattern leakage
and formalize it below.
Definition 3.4.3 (Query pattern). For two queries q, q′ define Sim(q, q′) = (u = u′,u =
v′,v = u′, v = v′), i.e., whether each of the nodes q = (u, v) matches each of the nodes
of q′ = (u′, v′). Let q = (q1, . . . , qm) be a non-empty sequence of queries. Every query
qi ∈ q specifies a pair of nodes ui, vi. The query pattern leakage function LQP (q) returns
an m ×m (symmetric) matrix with entry i, j equals Sim(qi, qj). Note that LQP does not
leak the identities of the queried nodes.
We do not claim that it is always reasonable for a graph encryption scheme to leak
the query pattern - it may convey sensitive information in some settings. Furthermore,
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Definition 3.4.2 does not attempt to capture all possible leakages. As with many similar
definitions, it does not capture side channels, and, furthermore, it does not capture leak-
age resulting from the client’s behavior given the query answers, which, in turn may be
affected by the choice of an approximation algorithm (see also [Feigenbaum et al., 2006,
Halevi et al., 2001] for a discussion of privacy of approximation algorithms).
3.4.2.3 Sketch pattern leakage
Our third construction, GraphEnc3, leaks the query pattern and an additional pattern we
refer to as the sketch pattern. The sketch pattern reveals which seeds are shared between
the different sketches of the oracle and the size of the sketches. We formalize this below
by revealing randomized “pseudo-ids” of the seeds in each sketch.
Definition 3.4.4 (Sketch pattern leakage). The sketch pattern leakage function LSP (ΩG, q)
for a graph G and a query q = (u, v) is a pair (X,Y ), where X = {f(w) : (w, δ) ∈ Sku}
and Y = {f(w) : (w, δ) ∈ Skv} are multi-sets and f is a uniformly random from the family
of functions: {0, 1}logn → {0, 1}logn.
It is not clear what this leakage implies in practice but we note that the
leakage is not (directly) over the graph but over the sketches which contain
a random subset of nodes. Therefore, it may be possible to add some form
of noise in the sketches (e.g., using fake sketch elements) to guarantee some
level of privacy to the original graph. We note that leakage is revealed in
all SSE constructions such as [Song et al., 2000, Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005,
Goh, 2003, Curtmola et al., 2006, Chase and Kamara, 2010, Kamara et al., 2012,
Kurosawa and Ohtaki, 2012, Kamara and Papamanthou, 2013, Cash et al., 2013a,
Naveed et al., 2014, Cash et al., 2014]. However, in all these constructions the leakage is
over a data structure (e.g., an inverted index) that holds all of the original data (i.e., all
the keywords and documents). In our case, the leakage is over a structure that holds only
a random subset of the data. This could provide additional help with respect to privacy
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but this is a topic for future work and is not the main focus of this paper.
3.4.3 Efficiency
We evaluate the efficiency and practicality of our constructions according to the following
criteria:
• Setup time: the time for the client to pre-process and encrypt the graph;
• Space complexity: the size of the encrypted graph;
• Query time: The time to execute a shortest distance query on the encrypted graph;
• Communication complexity: the number of bits exchanged during a query operation.
3.5 GRECS Constructions
In this section, we describe our three oracle encryption schemes. The first scheme,
GraphEnc1, is computationally efficient, but has high communication overhead. Our sec-
ond scheme, GraphEnc2, is communication efficient but has high space overhead. Our third
scheme, GraphEnc3, is computationally efficient with optimal communication complexity.
GraphEnc1 and GraphEnc2 do not leak anything besides the Query Pattern, and GraphEnc3
also leaks the Sketch Pattern.
3.5.1 A Computationally-Efficient Scheme
We now describe our first scheme which is quite practical. The scheme, described below,
makes use of symmetric-key primitives which results in a simple and very efficient construc-
tion. The scheme GraphEnc1 = (Setup, distQuery) makes use of a symmetric-key encryption
scheme SKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) and a PRP P . The Setup algorithm works as follows. Given
a 1λ,ΩG, α and ε:
• It pads each sketch to the maximum sketch size S by filling them with dummy values
(S can be determined after all the sketches are computed).
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• It then generates keys K1,K2 for the encryption scheme and PRP respectively and
sets K = (K1,K2). For all v ∈ V , it computes a label PK2(v) and creates an
encrypted sketch ESkv = (c1, ..., cλ), where ci ← EncK1(wi‖δi) is a symmetric-key
encryption of the ith pair (wi, δi) in Skv.
• It then sets up a dictionary DX in which it stores, for all v ∈ V , the pairs
(PK2(v),ESkv), ordered by the labels. The encrypted graph is then simply EO = DX.
The distQuery protocol works as follows. To query EO on q = (u, v), the client sends
a token tk = (tk1, tk2) = (PK2(u), PK2(v)) to the server which returns the pair ESku :=
DX[tk1] and ESkv := DX[tk2]. The client then decrypts each encrypted sketch and computes
mins∈I dist(u, s) + dist(s, v) (note that the algorithm only needs the sketches of the nodes
in the query).
3.5.2 Security and efficiency.
It is straightforward to see that the scheme is adaptively (L,LQP )-semantically secure,
where L is the function that returns n, S and D. Proof Sketch: Consider the simulator S
that works as follows. Given leakage LSetup(ΩG) = (S,D), it starts by generating (pk, sk)←
SWHE.Gen(1λ). For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it then samples `i $← {0, 1}logn without repetition
and sets DX[`i] := Ti, where Ti is an array that holds t = 2 · S2m · ε−1 homomorphic
encryptions of 0 ∈ 2N , where N = 2 · D + 1. It outputs EO = DX. Given leakage
LQuery(ΩG, q) = LQP (ΩG, q) it checks if either of the query nodes u or v appeared in any
previous query. If u appeared previously, S sets tk1 to the value that was previously used.
If not, it sets tk1 := `i for some previously unused `i. It does the same for the query node
v; that is, it sets tk2 to be the previously used value if v was previously queried or to an
unused `i if it was not. The theorem follows from the pseudo-randomness of P and the
CPA-security of the symmetric encryption scheme. 
The communication complexity of the distQuery protocol is linear in S, where S is the
maximum sketch size. Note that even though S is sub-linear in n, it could still be large
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in practice. For example, in the Das Sarma et al. construction S = O(n2/α · log n). Also,
in the case of multiple concurrent queries, this could be a significant bottleneck for the
scheme.
In the following Section, we show how to achieve a solution with O(1) communication
complexity and in Section 3.6 we experimentally show that it scales to graphs with millions
of nodes.
3.5.3 A Communication-Efficient Scheme
We now describe our second scheme GraphEnc2 = (Setup, distQuery) which is less compu-
tationally efficient than our first but is optimal with respect to communication complexity.
Algorithm 1: Setup algorithm for GraphEnc2
Input : 1λ,ΩG, α, ε
Output: EO
1 begin Setup
2 Sample K
$← {0, 1}k;
3 Initialize a dictionary DX;
4 Generate a key pair (pk, sk)← SWHE.Gen(1λ);
5 Set S := maxv∈V |Skv|;
6 Set D := maxv∈V
{
max(w,δ)∈Skv δ
}
;
7 Set N := 2 ·D + 1 and t = 2 · S2 · ε−1;
8 Sample a hash function h : V → [t] from H;
9 foreach v ∈ V do
10 compute `v := PK(v);
11 initialize an array Tv of size t;
12 foreach (wi, δi) ∈ Skv do
13 set Tv[h(wi)]← SWHE.Encpk(2N−δi);
14 fill remaining cells of Tv with encryptions of 0; set DX[`v] := Tv;
15 Output K and EO = DX
The details of the construction are given in Algorithms 1 and 2. It makes use of
a SWHE scheme SWHE = (Gen,Enc,Dec,Eval), a pseudo-random permutation P and a
family of universal hash functions H.
The Setup algorithm works as follows. Given 1λ, ΩG, α, and ε as inputs, it generates
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a public/secret-key pair (pk, sk) for SWHE. Let D be the maximum distance over all the
sketches and S be the maximum sketch size. Setup sets N := 2 ·D+ 1 and samples a hash
function h
$← H with domain V and co-domain [t], where t = 2 · S2 · ε−1.
It then creates a hash table for each node v ∈ V . More precisely, for each node v, it
processes each pair (wi, δi) ∈ Skv and stores Encpk(2N−δi) at location h(wi) of a t-size array
Tv. In other words, for all v ∈ V , it creates an array Tv such that for all (wi, δi) ∈ Skv,
Tv[h(wi)]← Encpk(2N−δi). It then fills the empty cells of Tv with homomorphic encryptions
of 0 and stores each hash table Tv1 through Tvn in a dictionary DX by setting, for all v ∈ V ,
DX[PK(v)] := Tv. Finally, it outputs DX as the encrypted oracle EO.
Fig. 3.2 below provides an example of one of the hash tables Tv generated from a
sketch Skv = {(w1, δ1), . . . , (ws, δs)}, where s is the size of the sketch. For all i ∈ [s], the
ciphertext Encpk(2
N−δi) is stored at location h(wi) of the table Tv. For example, we place
Encpk(2
2−δj ) to Tv[h(wj)] since h(wj) = 1. Finally, all remaining locations of Tv are filled
with SWHE encryptions of 0. Notice that, since we are using probabilistic encryption, the
encryptions of 0 are different, and are indistinguishable from the encryptions of the other
values.
! …!…!Tv Encpk (2N−δi ) Encpk (2N−δk )Encpk (2N−δ j ) Encpk (0)Encpk (0)Encpk (0)
0 h(wi) h(wj) h(wk)2 t-1
Figure 3.2: One node’s encrypted hash table.
The distQuery protocol works as follows. Given a query q = (u, v), the client sends
tokens (tk1, tk2) = (PK(u), PK(v)) to the server which uses them to retrieve the hash
tables of nodes u and v by computing Tu := DX[tk1] and Tv := DX[tk2]. The server
then homomorphically evaluates an inner product over the hash tables. More precisely, it
computes c :=
∑t
i=1 Tu[i] · Tv[i], where
∑
and · refer to the homomorphic addition and
multiplication operations of of the SWHE scheme. Finally, the server returns only c to the
client who decrypts it and outputs 2N − log2 (Decsk(c)).
Note that the storage complexity at the server is O(n · t) and the communication
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Algorithm 2: DistQuery algorithm for GraphEnc2
Input : Client’s input is (K, q) and server’s input is EO.
Output: Client’s output is distq and server’s output is ⊥.
1 begin distQuery
2 C: client parses q as (u, v);
3 C ⇒ S: client sends tk = (tk1, tk2) = (PK(u), PK(v));
4 S: server retrieves T1 := DX[tk1] and T2 := DX[tk2];
5 foreach i ∈ [t] do
6 Server computes ci ← SWHE.Eval(×,T1[i],T2[i]);
7 S ⇒ C: server sends c← SWHE.Eval(+, c1, . . . , ct);
8 C: client computes m← SWHE.Decsk(c);
9 C: client outputs dist = 2N − logm.
complexity of distQuery is O(1) since the server only returns a single ciphertext. In Section
3.5.3.1, we analyze the correctness and security of the scheme.
Remark. The reason we encrypt 2N−δi as opposed to δi is to make sure we can get the
minimum sum over the distances from the sketches of both u and v. Our observation is
that 2x+2y is bounded by 2max(x,y)+1. As we show Theorem 3.5.2, this approach does not,
with high probability, affect the approximation factor from what the underlying distance
oracle give us.
Instantiating & optimizing the SWHE scheme. For our experiments (see Section
3.6) we instantiate the SWHE scheme with the BGN construction of [Boneh et al., 2005].
We choose BGN due to the efficiency of its encryption algorithm and the compact-
ness of its ciphertexts and keys (as compared to the lattice-based construction of
[Gentry et al., 2010]). Unfortunately, the BGN decryption algorithm is expensive as it
requires computations of discrete logarithms. To improve this, we make use of various
optimizations. In particular, we compute discrete logs during decryption using the Baby
step Giant step algorithm [Shanks, 1971] and use a pre-computed table to speed up the
computation. More precisely, recall that decryption in BGN requires solving an equation of
the form csk = (gsk)m, where c is the ciphertext, sk is the secret key and g is the generator
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of the underlying group. The messages m we need to decrypt are from a bounded domain
[22N ]. Here, the value of N corresponds, roughly, to the diameter of the graph. During
the pre-computation phase, we set x = d
√
22Ne and pre-compute gj for all j ∈ [x], storing
them in a lookup-table. During decryption, we first compute c · g−ix for all i ∈ [x] and
store them in another table. We then compare it with each element of the first look-up
table (i.e., for all j ∈ [x]). We set m = ix+ j if there is a match, otherwise we return ⊥.
3.5.3.1 Correctness
Here, we analyze the correctness of GraphEnc2. We first bound the collision probability of
our construction and then proceed to prove correctness in Theorem 3.5.2 below.
Lemma 3.5.1. Let q = (u, v) be a shortest distance query and let Eq be the event that
a collision occurred in the Setup algorithm while constructing the hash tables Tu and Tv.
Then, Pr [Eq ] ≤ 2 · S2t .
Proof Sketch: Let Collv be the event that at least one collision occurs while creating v’s
hash table Tv (i.e., in Algorithm 1 Setup Line 13). Also, let XCollu,v be the event that there
exists at least one pair of distinct nodes wu ∈ Sku and wv ∈ Skv such that h(wu) = h(wv).
For any q = (u, v), we have
Pr [Eq ] ≤ Pr [Collu ] + Pr [Collv ] + Pr [XCollu,v ]. (3.1)
Let su be the size of Sku an sv be the size of Skv. Since there are
(
su
2
)
and
(sv
2
)
node
pairs in Sku and Skv, respectively, and each pair collides under h with probability at most
1/t, Pr [Collu ] ≤ s
2
u
2·t and Pr [Collv ] ≤ s
2
v
2·t . On the other hand, if I is the set of common
nodes in Sku and Skv, then
Pr [XCollu,v ] ≤ (su − |I|)(sv − |I|)
t
Recall that su = sv ≤ S, so by combining with Eq. 3.1, we have Pr [Eq ] ≤ 2 · S2t . 
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Note that in practice “intra-sketch” collision events Collu and Collv may or may not
affect the correctness of the scheme. This is because the collisions could map the SWHE
encryptions to locations that hold encryptions of 0 in other sketches. This means that at
query time, these SWHE encryptions will not affect the inner product operation since they
will be canceled out. Inter-sketch collision events XCollu,v, however, may affect the results
since they will cause different nodes to appear in the intersection of the two sketches and
lead to an incorrect sum.
Theorem 3.5.2. Let G = (V,E), α ≥ 1 and ε < 1. For all q = (u, v) ∈ V 2 with u 6= v,
Pr [α · dist(u, v)− log |I| ≤ d ≤ α · dist(u, v) ] ≥ 1− ε,
where (d,⊥) := GraphEnc2.distQuery
(
(K, q),EO
)
, (K,EO) ←
GraphEnc2.Setup(1
λ,ΩG, α, ε), and I is the number of common nodes between Sku
and Skv.
Proof Sketch: Let I be the set of nodes in common between Sku and Skv and let
mindist = minwi∈I{δui + δvi }, where for all 0 ≤ i ≤ |I|, δui ∈ Sku and δvi ∈ Skv. Note that at
line 7 in Algorithm 2 distQuery, the server returns to the client c =
∑t
i=1 Tu[i] · Tv[i].
Let Eq be the event a collision occurred during Setup in the construction of the hash
tables Tu and Tv of u and v respectively. Conditioned on Eq, we therefore have that
c =
|I|∑
i=1
Encpk(2
N−δui ) · Encpk(2N−δvi )
= Encpk
(
22N · Σ|I|i=12−(δ
u
i +δ
v
i )
)
,
where the first equality holds since for any node wi 6∈ I, one of the homomorphic encryptions
Tu[i] or Tv[i] is an encryption of 0. It follows then that (conditioned on Eq) at Step 9 the
client outputs
d = 2N − log (22N · Σ|I|i=12−(δui +δvi ))
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≤ 2N − log (22N−mindist)
≤ mindist,
where the first inequality holds since mindist ≤ (δui + δvi ) for all i ∈ |I|. Towards showing a
lower bound on d note that
d = 2N − log (22N · Σ|I|i=12−(δui +δvi ))
≥ 2N − log (22N−mindist + |I|)
≥ mindist− log |I|,
where the first inequality also holds from mindist ≤ (δui + δvi ) for all i ∈ |I|. Now, by
the (α, ε)-correctness of DO, we have that mindist ≤ α · dist(u, v) with probability at least
(1− ε) over the coins of DO.Setup. So, conditioned on Eq,
mindist− log |I| ≤ d ≤ α · dist(u, v).
The Theorem follows by combining this with Lemma 3.5.1 which bounds the probability
of Eq and noting that Setup sets t = 2 · S2 · ε−1. 
Space complexity. Note that to achieve (α, ε)-correctness, our construction produces
encrypted sketches that are larger than the original sketches. More precisely, if the max-
imum sketch size of the underlying distance oracle is S, then the size of every encrypted
sketch is t = 2 · S2 · ε−1, which is considerably larger. In Section 3.5.5, we describe a third
construction which achieves better space efficiency at the cost of more leakage.
Remark on the approximation. Note that Theorem 3.5.2 also provides a lower bound
of α · dist(u, v) − log |I| for the approximate distance. In particular, the bound depends
on the set of common nodes |I| which varies for different queries but is small in practice.
Furthermore, if log |I| is larger than mindist, the approximate distance returned could be
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negative (we indeed observe a few occurrences of this in our experiments).
To improve the accuracy of the approximation, one could increase the base in the homo-
morphic encryptions. More precisely, instead of using encryptions of the form Encpk(2
N−δ)
we could use Encpk(B
N−δ) for B = 3 or B = 4. This would result in an improved lower
bound of mindist− logB |I| but would also increase the homomorphic decryption time since
this increases the message space which in turn adds overhead to the decryption algorithm.
We leave it as an open problem to further improve this lower bound without increasing the
message space.
Remark on error rate. Given the above analysis, a client that makes γ queries will
have an error ratio of ε · γ. In our experiments we found that, in practice, when using the
Das Sarma et al. oracle, setting σ ≈ 3 results in a good approximation. So if we fix σ = 3
and set t = O(
√
n), then the error rate is O
(
γ · log2(n)/√n) which decreases significantly
as n grows. In the case of the Cohen et al. all-distance sketch, if we fix ρ = 4 and set
t = O(
√
n), then we achieve about the same error rate O
(
γ · ln2(n)/√n). We provide in
Section 3.6 detailed experimental result on the error rate.
3.5.4 Error Detection
We provide a method to detect those inter-collisions. In general, the collisions caused by
the hash functions can be detected by associating with each encryption of a node a random
value and its inverse value that are unique for each node. If two different nodes collide,
the product of these values will be a random value, whereas if the same node is mapped to
the same entry the product will give 1. More discussion about this technique will appear
in the full version of this work. Speficically, for each node, we create two copies of the
hash table, say DX and DX′. For each node v ∈ V , we produce the unique random value
and it inverse for each wi in v’s sketch. This can be done by computing the PRF F under
a different key K ′ $←− {0, 1}λ, i.e. FK(wi). Specifically, for each (wi, δi) ∈ Skv, initialize
two arrays Tv and T
′
v of size t. Next, we place Tv[h(wi)] ← Π.Enc(FK(wi) · 2N−δi) and
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T′v[h(wi)]← Π.Enc(F−1K (wi) ·2N−δi). In DistQuery, if two different nodes collide due to the
hash function then the product of these values will produce some random values, where if
the same node is mapped to the same entry the product will give the correct result.
3.5.4.1 Security
In the following theorem, we analyze the security of GraphEnc2.
Theorem 3.5.3. If P is pseudo-random and SWHE is CPA-secure then GraphEnc2, as
described above, is adaptively (LSetup,LQuery)-semantically secure, where LSetup(ΩG) =
(n, S,D) and LQuery(ΩG, q) = LQP (ΩG, q).
Proof Sketch: Consider the simulator S that works as follows. Given leakage LSetup = n,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it samples `i $← {0, 1}logn (without repetition) and creates an array Ti
of size t filled with homomorphic encryption of 0. It then creates a dictionary DX and sets
DX[`i] = Ti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Finally, it outputs EO = DX. Given leakage LQP (q), S first
checks whether any of the two query nodes appeared in an earlier query. If the first query
node appeared in a previous query, S sets tk1 to its stored token. Otherwise S chooses a
fresh token tk1
$← {0, 1}logn and stores it. S proceeds similarly with token tk2 and then
sends tk = (tk1, tk2).
It now remains to show that the RealA(1λ) and IdealA,S(1λ) experiments will output
1 with negligibly-close probability. This can be done using the following sequence of 3
games:
• Game0: this game corresponds exactly to a RealA(1λ) experiment.
• Game1: is the same as Game0 except that the output of P is replaced with random
(log n)-bit strings. Clearly, the pseudo-randomness of P guarantees that
|Pr[Game0 = 1]− Pr[Game1 = 1]| ≤ negl(k).
• Game2: is the same as Game1 except that all the HE encryptions are replaced with
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HE encryptions of 0. Clearly, it follows by the CPA-security of SWHE that
|Pr[Game1 = 1]− Pr[Game2 = 1]| ≤ negl(k).
Note that, by construction, Game2 corresponds exactly to an IdealA,S(1λ) experiment so
we have ∣∣∣Pr [RealA(1λ) = 1 ]− Pr [ IdealA,S(1λ) = 1 ]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(k)
from which the Theorem follows. The Theorem follows from the pseudo-randomness of P
and the CPA-security of SWHE. 
3.5.5 A Space-Efficient Construction
Although our second construction, GraphEnc2, achieves optimal communication complexity,
it has two limitations. The first is that it is less computationally-efficient than our first
construction GraphEnc1 both with respect to constructing the encrypted graph and to
querying it. The second limitation is that its storage complexity is relatively high; that is,
it produces encrypted graphs that are larger than the ones produced by GraphEnc1 by a
factor of 2 · S · ε−1. These limitations are mainly due to the need to fill the hash tables
with many homomorphic encryptions of 0. This also slows down the query algorithm since
it has to homomorphically evaluate an inner product on two large tables.
To address this, we propose a third construction GraphEnc3 = (Setup, distQuery) which
is both space-efficient and achieves O(1) communication complexity. The only trade-off is
that it leaks more than the two previous constructions.
The details of the scheme are given in Algorithms 3 and 4. At a high-level, the scheme
works similarly to GraphEnc2 with the exception that the encrypted sketches do not store
encryptions of 0’s, i.e., they only store the node/distance pairs of the sketches constructed
by the underlying distance oracle. Implementing this high-level idea is not straightforward,
however, because simply removing the encryptions of 0’s from the encrypted sketches/hash
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Algorithm 3: Setup algorithm for GraphEnc3
Input : 1λ,ΩG, α, ε
Output: EO
1 begin Setup
2 Sample K1,K2
$← {0, 1}λ;
3 Initialize a counter ctr = 1;
4 Let Z =
∑
v∈V |Skv|;
5 Sample a random permutation pi over [Z];
6 Initialize an array Arr of size Z;
7 Initialize a dictionary DX of size n;
8 Generate (pk, sk)← SWHE.Gen(1λ);
9 Set S := maxv∈V |Skv|;
10 Set D := maxv∈V
{
max(w,δ)∈Skv δ
}
;
11 Set N := 2 ·D + 1 and t = 2 · S2 · ε−1;
12 Initialize collision-resistant hash function h : V → [t];
13 foreach v ∈ V do
14 sample Kv ← {0, 1}λ;
15 foreach (wi, δi) ∈ Skv do
16 compute ci ← SWHE.Encpk(2N−δi);
17 if i 6= |Skv| then
18 Set Ni = 〈h(wi)‖ci‖pi(ctr + 1)〉;
19 else
20 Set Ni = 〈h(wi)‖ci‖NULL〉;
21 Sample ri
$← {0, 1}λ;
22 Set Arr[pi(ctr)] := 〈Ni ⊕H(Kv‖ri), ri〉;
23 Set ctr = ctr + 1 ;
24 foreach v ∈ V (in random order) do
25 Set DX[PK1(v)] := 〈addrArr(hv)‖Kv〉 ⊕ FK2(v)
26 Output K = (K1,K2, pk, sk) and EO = (DX, Arr);
tables reveals the size of the underlying sketches to the server which, in turn, leaks struc-
tural information about the graph. We overcome this technical difficulty by adapting a
technique from [Curtmola et al., 2006] to our setting. Intuitively, we view the seed/distance
pairs in each sketch Skv as a linked-list where each node stores a seed/distance pair. We
then randomly shuffle all the nodes and place them in an array; that is, we place each
node of each list at a random location in the array while updating the pointers so that the
“logical” integrity of the lists are preserved (i.e., given a pointer to the head of a list we
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can still find all its nodes). We then encrypt all the nodes with a per-list secret key.
The scheme makes use of a SWHE scheme SWHE = (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec), a pseudo-
random permutation P , a pseudo-random function F , a random oracle H and a collision-
resistant hash function h modeled as a random function
The Setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter k, an oracle ΩG , an ap-
proximation factor α, and an error parameter ε < 1. As shown in Algorithm 3, it first
initializes a counter ctr = 1 and samples a random permutation pi over the domain [Z],
where Z =
∑
v∈V |Skv|. It then initializes an Z-size array Arr. It proceeds to create an
encrypted sketch ESkv from each sketch Skv as follows. It first samples a symmetric key Kv
for this sketch. Then for each seed/distance pair (wi, δi) in Skv, it creates a linked-list node
Ni = 〈h(wi)‖ci‖pi(ctr + 1)〉, where ci ← Encpk(2N−δi), and stores an H-based encryption
〈Ni ⊕H(Kv‖rv), rv〉 of the node at location pi(ctr) in Arr. For the last seed/distance pair,
it uses instead a linked-list node of the form Ni = 〈h(wi)‖ci‖NULL〉, it then increments ctr.
Setup then creates a dictionary DX where it stores for each node v ∈ V , the pair
(PK1(v), 〈addrArr(hv)‖Kv〉⊕FK2(v)), where addrArr(hv) is the location in Arr of the head of
v’s linked-list. Figure 3.3 provides a detailed example for how we encrypt the sketch. Sup-
pose node u’s sketch Sku has the element (a, d1), (b, d2), (c, d3). The locations ind1, ind2, ind3
in Arr are computed according the random permutation pi.
The distQuery protocol, which is shown in Algorithm 4, works as follows. Given a query
q = (u, v), the client sends tokens (tk1, tk2, tk3, tk4) = (PK1(u), PK1(v), FK2(u), FK2(v)) to
the server which uses them to retrieve the values γ1 := DX[tk1] and γ2 := DX[tk2]. The
server computes 〈a1||Ku〉 := γ1 ⊕ tk3 and 〈b1||Kv〉 := γ2 ⊕ tk4. Next, it recovers the lists
pointed to by a1 and b1. More precisely, starting with i = 1, it parses Arr[a1] as 〈σu, ru〉
and decrypts σu by computing 〈hi‖ci‖ai+1〉 := σu ⊕ H(Ku‖ru) while ai+1 6= NULL. And
starting with j = 1, it does the same to recover 〈h′j‖c′j‖bj+1〉 while bj+1 6= NULL.
The server then homomorphically computes an inner product over the ciphertexts with
the same hashes. More precisely, it computes ans :=
∑
(i,j):hi=h′j
ci · c′j , where
∑
and ·
refer to the homomorphic addition and multiplication operations of the SWHE scheme.
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…% …% Kv||ind1      FK2(v) …%DX:
(a,%d1)
(b,%d2)
(c,%d3)
v : <h(b)||SWHE.Enc(2N-d2))||ind3%%%%%H(Kv||r2), r2>
<(h(c)||SWHE.Enc(2N-d3))||NULL%%%%%H(Kv||r3), r3>
<h(a)||SWHE.Enc(2N-d1))||ind2%%%%%%H(Kv||r1), r1>
Figure 3.3: Example of encrypting Sku = {(a, d1), (b, d2), (c, d3)}.
Finally, the server returns only ans to the client which decrypts it and outputs 2N −
log2 (SWHE.Decsk(ans)).
Note that the storage complexity at the server is O(m + |V |) and the communication
complexity of distQuery is still O(1) since the server only returns a single ciphertext.
3.5.5.1 Correctness and Security
The correctness of GraphEnc3 follows directly from the correctness of GraphEnc2. To see
why, observe that: (1) the homomorphic encryptions stored in the encrypted graph of
GraphEnc3 are the same as those in the encrypted graph produced by GraphEnc2 with the
exception of the encryptions of 0; and (2) the output d of the client results from executing
the same homomorphic operations as in GraphEnc2, with the exception of the homomorphic
sums with 0-encryptions.
We note that GraphEnc3 leaks only a little more than the previous constructions. With
respect to setup leakage it reveals, in addition to (n, S,D), the total number of seeds Z.
Intuitively, for a query q = (u, v), the query leakage consists the query pattern leakage in
addition to: (1) which seed/distance pairs in the sketches Sku and Skv are the same; and
(2) the size of these sketches. This is formalized in Definition 3.4.4 as the sketch pattern
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Algorithm 4: The protocol distQueryC,S .
Input : Client’s input is K, q = (u, v) and server’s input is EO
Output: Client’s output is d and server’s output is ⊥
1 begin distQuery
2 C: computes (tk1, tk2, tk3, tk4) = (PK1(u), PK1(v), FK2(u), FK2(v));
3 C ⇒ S: sends tk = (tk1, tk2, tk3, tk4);
4 S: computes γ1 ← DX[tk1] and γ2 ← DX[tk2];
5 if γ1 = ⊥ or γ2 = ⊥ then
6 exit and return ⊥ to the client
7 S: compute 〈a1||Ku〉 := γ1 ⊕ tk3;
8 S: parse Arr[a1] as 〈σu, ru〉;
9 S: compute N1 := σu ⊕H(Ku‖ru);
10 repeat
11 parse Ni as 〈hi‖ci‖ai+1〉;
12 parse Arr[ai+1] as 〈σi+1, ri+1〉;
13 compute Ni+1 := σi+1 ⊕H(Ku‖ri+1);
14 set i = i+ 1;
15 until ai+1 = NULL;
16 S: compute 〈b1||Kv〉 := γ2 ⊕ tk4;
17 S: parse Arr[b1] as 〈σv, rv〉;
18 S: compute N′1 := σv ⊕H(Kv‖rv);
19 repeat
20 parse N′j as 〈h′j‖c′j‖bj+1〉;
21 parse Arr[bj+1] as 〈σj+1, rj+1〉;
22 compute N′j+1 := σj+1 ⊕H(Kv‖rj+1);
23 set j = j + 1;
24 until bj+1 = NULL;
25 S: set s := SWHE.Encpk(0);
26 foreach (Ni, N
′
j) do
27 if hi = h
′
j then
28 compute p := SWHE.Eval(×, ci, c′j);
29 compute s := SWHE.Eval(+, s, p);
30 S ⇒ C: send s;
31 C: compute d := SWHE.Decsk(s)
leakage LSP (ΩG, q). In the following Theorem, we summarize the security of GraphEnc3.
Theorem 3.5.4. If P and F are pseudo-random, if SWHE is CPA-secure then GraphEnc3,
as described above, is adaptively (LSetup,LQuery)-semantically secure in the random oracle
model, where LSetup(ΩG) = (n, S,D,Z) and LQuery(ΩG, q) = (LQP (ΩG, q),LSP (ΩG, q)).
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Proof Sketch: Consider the simulator S that works as follows. Given leakage LSetup =
(n, S,D,Z), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ Z it samples Γi $← {0, 1}log t+g(N)+logZ+λ, where g(·) is the
ciphertext expansion of SWHE, t = 2 ·S2 · ε−1 and N = 2 ·D+ 1. It then stores all the Γi’s
in a Z-element array Arr. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it samples `i $← {0, 1}logn without repetition
and sets DX[`i]
$← {0, 1}logZ+k. Finally, it outputs EO = (DX, Arr).
Given leakage LQuery(G, q) = (LQP (G, q),LSP (G, q)) such that LSP (G, q) = (X,Y ),
S first checks if either of the query nodes u or v appeared in any previous query. If u
appeared previously, S sets tk1 and tk3 to the values that were previously used. If not,
it sets tk1 := `i for some previously unused `i and tk3 as follows. It chooses a previously
unused α ∈ [Z] at random, a key Ku $← {0, 1}k and sets tk3 := DX[tk1]⊕ 〈α‖Ku〉. It then
remembers the association between Ku and X and the sketch size |Sku|. It does the same
for the query node v, sets tk2 and tk4 analogously and associates |Skv| and Y with the key
Kv it chooses.
It simulates the random oracle H as follows. Given (K, r) as input, it checks to see
if: (1) K has been queried before (in the random oracle); and (2) if any entry in Arr has
the form 〈s, r〉 where s is a (log t + g(N) + logZ)-bit string. If K has not been queried
before, it initializes a counter ctrK := 0. If an appropriate entry exists in Arr, it returns
s ⊕ 〈γ, c, p〉, where γ is the ctrth element of the multi-set X or Y associated with K, c
is a SWHE encryption of 0 and p is an unused address in Arr chosen at random or ∅ if
ctr = |Sk|, where |Sk| is the sketch size associated with K. If no appropriate entry exists
in Arr, S returns a random value. The Theorem then follows from the pseudo-randomness
of P and F and the CPA-security of SWHE. 
3.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present experimental evaluations of our schemes on a number of large-
scale graphs. We implement the Das Sarma et al. distance oracle (DO1) and Cohen et al.
distance oracle (DO2) and all three of our graph encryption schemes. We use AES-128 in
38
CBC mode for symmetric encryption and instantiate SWHE with the Boneh-Goh-Nissim
(BGN) scheme, implemented in C++ with the Stanford Pairing-Based Library PBC1. We
use OpenSSL2 for all basic cryptographic primitives and use 128-bit security for all the
encryptions. We use HMAC for PRFs and instantiate the hash function in GraphEnc3 with
HMAC-SHA-256. All experiments were run on a 24-core 2.9GHz Intel Xeon, with 512 GBs
of RAM running Linux.
3.6.1 Datasets
We use real-world graph datasets publicly available from the Stanford SNAP website3. In
particular, we use as-skitter, a large Internet topology graph; com-Youtube, a large so-
cial network based on the Youtube web site; loc-Gowalla, a location-based social network;
email-Enron, an email communication network; and ca-CondMat, a collaboration network
for scientific collaborations between authors of papers related to Condensed Matter re-
search. Table 3.1 summarizes the main characteristics of these datasets.
Dataset Nodes Edges Diameter Storage
as-skitter 1,696,415 11,095,298 25 143MB
com-Youtube 1,134,890 2,987,624 20 37MB
loc-Gowalla 196,591 950,327 14 11MB
email-Enron 36,692 367,662 11 1.84MB
ca-CondMat 23,133 186,936 14 158KB
Table 3.1: The graph datasets used in our experiments
Notice that some of these datasets contain millions of nodes and edges and that the
diameters of these graphs are small. This is something that has been observed in many real-
life graphs [Leskovec et al., 2005] and is true for expander and small-world graphs, which
are known to model many real-life graphs. The implication of this, is that the maximum
distance D in the sketches generated by the distance oracles is, in practice, small and
therefore the value N that we use in GraphEnc2 and GraphEnc3 (see Algorithm 1 and 3) is
1http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
2https://www.openssl.org/
3https://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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typically small.
3.6.2 Overview
For a graph G = (V,E) with n nodes, we summarize in Table 3.2 our constructions’ space,
setup, and communication complexities as well as the complexities for both the server and
client during the query phase. Note that the complexities for each scheme also depend
on α, however, in practice, since setting σ for DO1 (ρ for DO2) to some small numbers
resulted good approximations, therefore, it makes α = O(log n). In our experiments, we
test different σ and ρ’s and the sketch size, |Skv|, for each node is sublinear in the size of
the graph, i.e. O(log n).
Scheme GraphEnc1 GraphEnc2 GraphEnc3
Space O(n log n) O(n log2 n/ε) O(n log n)
Setup Time O(n log n) O(n log2 n/ε) O(n log n)
Communication O(log n) O(1) O(1)
Server Query Comp. O(1) O(log2 n/ε) O(log n)
Client Query Comp. O(log n) O(diameter) O(diameter)
Table 3.2: The space, setup, communication, and query complexities of our constructions
(α is set to be in O(log n)).
Table 3.3 summarizes our experimental results. Compared to existing schemes, such
as [Aly et al., 2013], our experiments shows that the constructions are very efficient and
scalable for large real dataset. For example, in [Aly et al., 2013], it takes several minutes
to securely compute the shortest path distance for graph with only tens to hundreds of
nodes, whereas it takes only seconds for our scheme to query the encrypted graph up to
1.6 million nodes.
3.6.3 Performance of GraphEnc1
We evaluate the performance of GraphEnc1 using both the Das Sarma et al. and Cohen et
al. distance oracles. For the Das Sarma et al. oracle (DO1), we set the sampling parameter
σ = 3 and for the Cohen et al. oracle (DO2) we set the rank parameter ρ = 4. We choose
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GraphEnc1 GraphEnc2 GraphEnc3
Dataset
sketch Graph Comm. Setup Time Size Comm. Setup Time Size Comm. Setup Time Size
size Sketching per query per node per node T per query per node per node per query per node per node
S Scheme (in bytes) (in ms) (in KBs) size (in bytes) (in secs) (in MBs) (in bytes) (in ms) (in KBs)
As-skitter
80 DO1 3,840 16.7 1.94 11K 34 7.3 1.1 34 20.1 1.91
71 DO2 3,120 14 1.63 8.4K 34 6.59 0.76 34 16 1.83
Youtube
80 DO1 3,840 16.5 1.94 10K 34 8 1.1 34 18.2 1.91
68 DO2 3,120 14.5 1.63 8.5K 34 6.57 0.76 34 17.3 1.7
Gowalla
70 DO1 3360 14.9 1.7 7.5K 34 7.4 0.82 34 15.6 1.71
53 DO2 2544 12 1.29 7K 34 5 0.62 34 14.7 1.41
Enron
60 DO1 2880 12.5 1.44 7K 34 5.6 0.76 34 14 1.48
45 DO2 2160 9.39 1.11 6.5K 34 4.81 0.53 34 10 1.25
CondMat
55 DO1 2640 11.8 1.34 5.5K 34 4.65 0.65 34 13.2 1.31
42 DO2 2016 7.8 1.03 5K 34 3.8 0.49 34 8.2 1.21
Table 3.3: A full performance summary for GraphEnc1, GraphEnc2, and GraphEnc3
these parameters because they resulted in good approximation ratios and the maximum
sketch sizes (i.e., S) of roughly the same amount. Note that, the approximation factor α
in those then is in O(log n) for GraphEnc1, therefore, the communication complexity (see
Table 3.2) in GraphEnc1 is O(log n). We can see from Table 3.3 that the time to setup an
encrypted graph with GraphEnc1 is practical—even for large graphs. For example, it takes
only 8 hours to setup an encryption of the as-skitter graph which includes 1.6 million nodes.
Since the GraphEnc1.Setup is highly-parallelizable, we could speed setup time considerably
by using a cluster. A cluster of 10 machines would be enough to bring the setup time down
to less than an hour. Furthermore, the size of the encrypted sketches range from 1KB for
CondMat to 1.94KB for as-skitter per node. The main limitation of this construction is
that the communication is proportional to the size of the sketches. We tested for various
sketch sizes, and the communication per query went up to 3.8KB for as-skitter when we
set S = 80. This can become quite significant if the server is interacting with multiple
clients.
3.6.4 Performance of GraphEnc2
The first column in Table 3.3 of the GraphEnc2 experiments gives the size the encrypted
hash tables Tv constructed during GraphEnc2.Setup. Table sizes range from 5K for ca-
CondMat to 11K for as-skitter.
The Time column gives the time to create an encrypted hash-table/sketch per node.
This includes generating the BGN encryptions of the distances and the 0-encryptions. Note
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that this makes GraphEnc2.Setup quite costly, about 3 orders of magnitude more expensive
than GraphEnc1.Setup. This is mostly due to generating the 0-encryptions. Note, however,
that similarly to GraphEnc1, we can use extensive parallelization to speed up the setup.
For example, using a cluster of 100 machines, we can setup the encrypted graph on the
order of hours, even for as-skitter which includes 1.6 million nodes. The space overhead per
node is also large, but the encrypted graph itself can be distributed in a cluster since every
encrypted sketch is independent of the other. Finally, as shown in Table 3.3, GraphEnc2
achieves a constant communication cost of 34B.
In Fig. 3.4, we report on the intra- and inter-collisions that we observed when executing
over 10K different queries over our data sets. The collision probability ranges between 1%
and 3.5%. As we can see from the results, the oracle DO2 has less collisions than DO1.
Figure 3.4: Collision probabilities for different datasets
3.6.5 Performance of GraphEnc3
The GraphEnc3 columns in Table 3.3 show that GraphEnc3 is as efficient as GraphEnc1 in
terms of setup time and encrypted sketch size. Moreover, it achieves O(1) communication
of 34B like GraphEnc2. Using a single machine, GraphEnc3.Setup took less than 10 hours
to encrypt as-skitter, but like the other schemes, it is highly parallelizable, and this could
be brought down to an hour using 10 machines. We instantiated the hash function h using
a cryptographic keyed hash function HMAC-SHA-256.
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3.6.5.1 Construction time & encrypted sketch size
Since the performance of GraphEnc3 depends only on the size of the underlying sketches we
investigate the relationship between the performance of GraphEnc3.Setup and the sampling
and rank parameters of the Das Sarma et al. and Cohen et al. oracles, respectively. We
use values of σ and ρ ranging from 3 to 6 in each case which resulted in maximum sketch
sizes S ranging from 43 to 80. Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 give the construction time and
size overhead of an encrypted sketch when using the Das Sarma et al. oracle and Cohen
et al. oracle respectively.
In each case, the construction time scales linearly when σ and ρ increase. Also, unlike
the previous schemes, GraphEnc3 produces encrypted sketches that are compact since it
does not use 0-encryptions for padding purposes.
3.6.5.2 Query Time
We measured the time to query an encrypted graph as a function of the oracle sam-
pling/rank parameter. The average time at the server (taken over 10K random queries)
is given in Figure 3.7 for all our graphs and using both distance oracles. The variance of
the queries is within 0.5 ms. In general, the results show that query time is very fast and
practical. For as-skitter, the query time ranges from 6.1 to 10 milliseconds with the Das
Sarma et al. oracle and from 5.6 to 10 milliseconds with the Cohen et al. oracle. Query
time is dominated by the homomorphic multiplication operation of the BGN scheme. But
the number of multiplications only depends on the number of common seeds from the
two encrypted sketches and, furthermore, these operations are independent so they can
be parallelized. We note that we use mostly un-optimized implementations of all the un-
derlying primitives and we believe that a more careful implementation (e.g., faster pairing
library) would reduce the query time even further. We also measure the decryption time
at the client. As pointed out previously, decryption time depends on N which itself is a
function of the diameter of the graph. Since all our graphs have small diameter, client de-
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Construction Time (in ms)
Size Overhead (in KB)
Figure 3.5: Construction time and size overhead (DO1)
Construction Time (in ms)
Size Overhead (in KB)
Figure 3.6: Construction time and size overhead (DO2)
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(b) Query Time (in ms) DO2
Figure 3.7: Average Query time
cryption time—which itself consists of a BGN decryption— was performed very efficiently.
In particular, the average decryption time was less than 4 seconds and in most cases the
decryption ranged between 1 and 3 seconds.
Finally, we would like to mention that there is some additional information that is
leaked. In our construction, we leak the parameter ρ and σ that are related to the size
of the encrypted graph and this may leak some information about how “hard” it is to
approximate the shortest distance values for the particular graph at hand. Also, the time
that it takes to estimate the final result at the client may reveal the diameter of the graph,
since it is related to the N and the max distance in the sketches.
3.6.6 Approximation errors
We investigate the approximation errors produced by our schemes. We generate 10K
random queries and run the QueryC,S protocol. For client decryption, we recover 2N−logm
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Figure 3.8: Mean of Estimated Error with Standard Deviation
and round it to its floor value. We used breadth-first search (BFS) to compute the exact
distances between each pair of nodes and we compare the approximate distance returned
by our construction to exact distances obtained with BFS. We report the mean and the
standard deviation of the relative error for each dataset. We used both oracles to compute
the sketches. We present our results in Figure 3.8, which shows that our approximations
are quite good. Indeed, our experiments show that our constructions could report better
approximations than the underlying oracles. This is due to the fact that both oracles
overestimate the distance so subtracting log |I| can improve the approximation. For the
Gowalla dataset, the mean of the relative error ranges from 0.36 to 0.13 when using the
Das Sarma et al. oracle DO1. For as-skitter, it ranges from 0.45 to 0.22. The mean error
and the variance decreases as we increase the size of each sketch. In addition, we note that
DO2 performs better in all datasets. Also, half of the distances returned are exact and
most of the distances returned are at most 2 away from the real distance. Figure 3.9 shows
the histogram for the absolute error when using DO2 with ρ = 3. All the other datasets
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are very similar to them, so we omit them due to space limitations.
Figure 3.9: Absolute error histogram DO2 and ρ = 3
We note that a very small number of distances were negative and we removed them
from the experiments. Negative distances result from the intersection size |I| being very
large. Indeed, when the client decrypts the SWHE ciphertext returned by the server, it
recovers d ≥ mindist− log |I|. If |I| is large and mindist is small (say, 1 or 2) then it is very
likely that d is negative. However, in the experiments, the number of removed negative
values were very small (i.e., 80 out of 10000 queries).
3.7 Application to Other Graph Queries
3.7.1 All-Distance Sketches
All-distances sketch (ADS) proposed by [Cohen et al., 2013, Cohen, 2014] can be used to
estimate the shortest distance as well. As defined in [Cohen et al., 2013], for the weighted
graph G, the all-distance sketch (ADS) of the node v, denote ADS(v), is the set of node
ID and distance pairs. The included nodes are sample of the nodes reachable from v
and with each included node u ∈ ADS(v) the corresponding distance duv is also stored.
Formally, followed by the notation from [Cohen, 2014, Cohen et al., 2013], let pivu denote
the Dijkstra rank of u with respect to v, defined as its position in the list of nodes ordered
by increasing distance from v. For any two nodes u, v, let Φ<u(v) = {j|pivj < pivu} for
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the set of nodes that are closer to v than u is. For a numeric function r : X → [0, 1] over
a set X, the function kthr (X) returns the k-th smallest value in the range of r on X. If
|X| < k then we define kthr (X) = 1. Finally, all-distance sketch(ADS) labels are defined
with respect to a random rank assignment to nodes such that for all v, r(v) ∼ U [0, 1], i.e,
they are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]:
ADS(v) = {(u, dvu)|r(u) < kthr (Φ<u(v))}
In other words, a node u belongs to ADS(v) if u is among the k nodes with lowest rank r
within the ball of radius dvu around v. (For simplicity, we abuse notation and often interpret
ADS(v) as a set of nodes, even though it is actually a set of pairs , each consisting of a
node and a distance.) Since the inclusion probability of a node is inversely proportional
to its Dijkstra rank, the expected size of ADS(v) is E|ADS(v)| ≤ k lnn, where n is the
number of nodes reachable from v.
It has been proved that one can use the ADS to estimate the distance between u and v.
The estimated distance d˜uv have the approximation factor (2d lognlog k e − 1) and the querying
algorithm is very similar to the distance oracle (see [Cohen et al., 2013] for details).
3.7.2 Graph Similarity Queries using All-Distance Sketches
The closeness similarity measures the similarity of two nodes based on their views of the
full graph. More precisely, we consider the distance from each of these two nodes to all
other nodes in the graph and measure how much these two distance vectors differ. This
is computationally expensive, but ADSs allow an efficient estimation of this measurement.
It has also been shown that the ADS can be used to measure the closeness between two
nodes. The following theorem show that it can be used to estimate the Dijkstra Rank
Closness (denote by J∗). The Dijkstra rank of node vj with respect to vi is vj ’s position
in the nearest neighbors list of vi when running the Dijkstra shortest path for the node vi.
Roughly speaking, closeness similarity is specified with respect to a distance function δij
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between two nodes, a distance decay function α′(d) (a monotone non-increasing function
of distances), and a weight function β(i) of node IDs. The basic expression for closeness
similarity is
Sα′,β(u, v) =
∑
i
α′(max{δu,iδv,i})β(i), (3.2)
By setting k to be the parameter h in the decay function in the Dijkstra ranks, the
following estimator can give a good estimation of J∗,
Jˆ∗(u, v) =
|ADS(u) ∩ADS(v)|
|ADS(u) ∪ADS(v)|
We refer the reader to [Cohen et al., 2013, Cohen, 2014] for details of how to set up the
parameter of the ADS and its applications.
3.7.3 Graph Encryption based on ADS
We can easily apply the techniques of section 3.5.1 and 3.5.3 to the ADS data structure. For
the approach in GraphEnc1, we generate the ADS for each node, the labels are computed
by applying the PRF to each node, then apply similar approach as in GraphEnc1 using
symmetric encryption. The Token and the Query algorithm are similarly defined. By
retrieving the encryptions of the sketches, the client can use the ADS to measure the
shortest distance and the estimation of the closeness. We will focus on the communication
efficient construction based on GraphEnc2.
In order to to support the approximate shortest distance queries, we construct the graph
encryption as GraphEnc2 except that during the GraphEnc2.Setup step (4) we generate the
ADS for each node instead of using the distance oracle approach. The rest of the steps
remains the same.
On the other hand, to measure J∗(u, v) between u and v, we will construct a graph
encryption scheme slightly different than the GraphEnc2 in Section 3.5.3. In Figure 5, we
present the construction for closeness queries. During the Setup in GraphEnc2, instead of
generating the sketches using the distance oracle, we generate the ADS for all the nodes,
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then apply the same method using SWHE. In addition, as stated in [Cohen et al., 2013],
ADS can be used to evaluate the similarity and closeness queries as well. Here we briefly
mention the method of measuring the Dijkstra Rank Closeness based all-distance sketch.
In the Setup, we first generate the ADS for each node. Next, for each v ∈ V , we compute
the label `v := PK(v) and initialize the array Tv of size t. For each (wi, δi) ∈ ADS, the only
changes is that we now set Tv[h(wi)] ← Π.Encpk(1) and fill the remaining the cells of the
Tv with encryption of 0. Next, in DistQuery(u, v), the client generates the token for u and
v by compute tk1 := PK(u) and tk2 := PK(v). When the server retrieves T1 := DX[tk1] and
T2 := DX[tk2], we can homomorphically evaluate the |ADS(u)| by computing the following:
ψ1 ← Π.Eval(+,T1[1], . . . ,T1[t]) (3.3)
Similarly, for |ADS(v)|, we can compute ψ2 ← Π.Eval(+,T2[1], . . . ,T2[t]). We can
alsohomomorphically evaluate the |ADS(u) ∩ ADS(v)|: for all i ∈ [t], the server computes
ci ← Π.Eval(×,T1[i],T2[i]), then the server computes ψ3 ← Π.Eval(+, c1, . . . , ct). Then
by sending all of those to the client, the client decrypts ψ1, ψ2, and ψ3, furthermore, the
client can get the |ADS(u) ∩ ADS(v)| by computing β := ψ1 + ψ2 − ψ3 due to the fact
|ADS(u) ∪ ADS(v)| = |ADS(u)| + |ADS(u)| − |ADS(u) ∩ ADS(v)|. Finally, the Dijkstra
Rank Closeness J∗(u, v) can be estimated by ψ3β .
The correctness of above simply follows the fact that the bit we place into the encryption
in Setup indicates the existence of whether the particular node hashes into the table T for
each node. The equation 3.3 homomorphically computes the size of the sketch. The inner
product between the two Ts gives the intersection size between ADS(u) and ADS(v).
The security proof of the scheme above is quite similar to the proof of GraphEnc2. The
simulator just has to simulate the appropriate size of list of the encryptions. The query
simulation is just like the simulation in GraphEnc2.
Our method ‘hash-and-encrypt’ techniques can be useful for many hop-based graph
queries. We want to point out that the estimation for particular queries under different
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Algorithm 5: Graph Encryption with Dijkstra Closeness Query with O(1) commu-
nication complexity
1 Let SWHE = (Gen,Enc,Dec,Eval) be a homomorphic encryption scheme,
P : V × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}log |V | be a pseudo-random permutation and H be a family
of universal hash functions. Consider the graph encryption scheme
GraphEnc3 = (Setup,DistQuery) that works as follows:
• Setup(1k, G, α, ε):
1. sample K
$← {0, 1}k and generate a key pair (pk, sk)← SWHE.Gen(1k);
2. set r = Θ˜
(
n2/(α+1)
)
and t = 2 · (r log n)2 · ε−1;
3. sample a hash function h : V → t from H;
4. Construct the ADS:
(a) compute ADS(v) for each v ∈ V .
5. Produce hash tables:
(a) For each node v ∈ V ,
i. compute `v := PK(v);
ii. initialize an array Tv of size t;
iii. for each (wi, δi) ∈ ADS(v), set Tv[h(wi)]← SWHE.Encpk(1);
iv. fill remaining cells of Tv with encryptions of 0;
v. set DX[`v] := Tv;
6. output EO = DX.
• DistQuery((K, q),EO):
1. the client parses q as (u, v) and sends a token tk = (tk1, tk2) = (PK(u), PK(v))
to the server;
2. the server retrieves T1 := DX[tk1] and T2 := DX[tk2];
3. R1 ← SWHE.Eval(+,T1[1], ...,T1[N ]).
4. R2 ← SWHE.Eval(+,T2[1], ...,T2[N ])
5. for all i ∈ [t], the server computes ci ← SWHE.Eval(×,T1[i],T2[i]);
6. the server computes and sends to the client R3 ← SWHE.Eval(+, c1, . . . , ct);
7. the client computes m← SWHE.Decsk(c) and computes Jˆ = R3R1+R2−R3 .
Finally, output Jˆ .
graph sketches mainly depends on the underlying sketch structure. Our method provide
a generic framework of encrypting the sketches. As shown in the previous section, our
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constructions, which incorporate the hash and SWHE, do not affect the bound estimation
much (in the case of measuring the closeness, the construction does not affect it at all).
Chapter 4
Top-k Query Processing on Encrypted Relational
Databases
4.1 Introduction
Although top-k queries are important query types in many database applica-
tions [Ilyas et al., 2008], to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works handle
the top-k queries securely and efficiently. Vaiyda et. al. [Vaidya and Clifton, 2005] stud-
ied privacy-preserving top-k queries in which the data are vertically partitioned instead of
encrypting the data. Wong et. al. [Wong et al., 2009] proposed an encryption scheme for
knn queries and mentioned a method of transforming their scheme to solve top-k queries,
however, as shown in [Yao et al., 2013], their encryption scheme is not secure and is vul-
nerable to chosen plaintext attacks. Vaiyda et. al. [Vaidya and Clifton, 2005] also studied
privacy-preserving top-k queries in which the data are vertically partitioned instead of
encrypting the data.
We assume that the data owner and the clients are trusted, but not the cloud server.
Therefore, the data owner encrypts each database relation R using some probabilistic
encryption scheme before outsourcing it to the cloud. An authorized user specifies a query
q and generates a token to query the server. Our objective is to allow the cloud to securely
compute the top-k results based on a user-defined ranking function over R, and, more
importantly, the cloud should not learn anything about R or q. Consider a real world
example for a health medical database below:
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Example 4.1.1. An authorized doctor, Alice, wants to get the top-k results based on
some ranking criteria from the encrypted electronic health record database patients (see
Table 4.1). The encrypted patients database may contain several attributes; here we only
list a few in Table 4.1: patient name, age, id number, trestbps 1, chol2, thalach3.
patient name age id trestbps chol thalach
E(Bob) E(38) E(121) E(110) E(196) E(166)
E(Celvin) E(43) E(222) E(120) E(201) E(160)
E(David) E(60) E(285) E(100) E(248) E(142)
E(Emma) E(36) E(956) E(120) E(267) E(112)
E(Flora) E(43) E(756) E(100) E(223) E(127)
Table 4.1: Encrypted patients Heart-Disease Data
One example of a top-k query (in the form of a SQL query) can be: SELECT * FROM
patients ORDERED BY chol+thalach STOP AFTER k. That is, the doctor wants to get the
top-2 results based the score chol+thalach from all the patient records. However, since this
table contains very sensitive information about the patients, the data owner first encrypts
the table and then delegates it to the cloud. So, Alice requests a key from the data owner
and generates a query token based on the query. Then the cloud searches and computes
on the encrypted table to find out the top-k results. In this case, the top-2 results are the
records of patients David and Emma.
Our protocol extends the No-Random-Access (NRA) [Fagin et al., 2001] algorithm for
computing top-k queries over a probabilistically encrypted relational database. Moreover,
our query processing model assumes that two non-colluding semi-honest clouds, which is the
model that has been showed working well (see [Elmehdwi et al., 2014, Bugiel et al., 2011,
Liu et al., 2015a, Baldimtsi and Ohrimenko, 2014, Bost et al., 2015]). We encrypt the
database in such a way that the server can obliviously execute NRA over the encrypted
database without learning the underlying data. This is accomplished with the help of a
secondary independent cloud server (or Crypto Cloud). However, the encrypted database
1trestbps: resting blood pressure (in mm Hg)
2chol: serum cholestoral in mg/dl
3maximum heart rate achieved
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resides only in the primary cloud. We adopt two efficient state-of-art secure protocols,
EncSort [Baldimtsi and Ohrimenko, 2014] and EncCompare [Bost et al., 2015], which are
the two essential building block we need in our top-k secure construction. We choose these
two building blocks mainly because of their efficiency.
During the query processing, we propose several novel sub-routines that can securely
compute the best/worst score and de-duplicate replicated data items over the encrypted
database. Notice that our proposed sub-protocols can also be used as stand-alone building
blocks for other applications as well. We also would like to point out that during the
querying phase the computation performed by the client is very small. The client only needs
to compute a simple token for the server and all of the relatively heavier computations are
performed by the cloud side. Moreover, we also explore the problem of top-k join queries
over multiple encrypted relations.
We also design a secure top-k join operator, denote as ./sec, to securely join the tables
based on equi-join condition. The cloud homomorphically computes the top-k join on the
top of joined results and reports the encrypted top-k results. Below we summarize our
main contributions:
• We propose a new practical protocol designed to answer top-k queries over encrypted
relational databases.
• We propose two encrypted data structures called EHL and EHL+ which allow the
servers to homomorphically evaluate the equality relations between two objects.
• We propose several independent sub-protocols such that the clouds can securely com-
pute the best/worst scores and de-duplicate replicated encrypted objects with the use
of another non-colluding server.
• We also extend our techniques to answer top-k join queries over multiple encrypted
relations.
• The scheme is experimentally evaluated using real-world datasets and result shows
that our scheme is efficient and practical.
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4.2 Related Works and Background
The problem of processing queries over the outsourced encrypted databases is not new.
The work [Hacigu¨mu¨s et al., 2002] proposed executing SQL queries over encrypted data
in the database-service-provider model using bucketization. Since then, a number of
works have appeared on executing various queries over encrypted data. One of the
relevant problem related to top-k queries is the kNN (k Nearest Neighbor) queries.
Note that top-k queries should not be confused with similarity search, such as kNN
queries. For the kNN queries, one is interested in retrieving the k most similar objects
over the database to a query object, where the similarity between two objects is mea-
sured over some metric space, for example the L2 metric. Many works have been pro-
posed to specifically handle kNN queries on encrypted data, such as [Wong et al., 2009,
Elmehdwi et al., 2014, Yao et al., 2013, Choi et al., 2014]. A significant amount of
works have been done for privacy preserving keyword search queries or boolean
queries, such as [Song et al., 2000, Curtmola et al., 2011, Cash et al., 2013b]. Recent
work [Samanthula et al., 2014] proposed a general framework for boolean queries of disjunc-
tive normal form queries on encrypted data. In addition, many works have been proposed
for range queries [Shi et al., 2007, Hore et al., 2012, Li et al., 2014]. Other relevant works
include privacy-preserving data mining [Lindell and Pinkas, 2000, Vaidya et al., 2008,
Aggarwal and Yu, 2008, Jaideep Vaidya, 2008, Murat Kantarcioglu, 2004].
Recent works in the cryptography community have shown that it is possible to
perform arbitrary computations over encrypted data, using fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) [Gentry, 2009a], or Oblivious RAM [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996]. How-
ever, the performance overheads of such constructions are very high in practice, thus
they’re not suitable for practical database queries. Some recent advancements in ORAM
schemes [Ren et al., 2015] show promise and can be potentially used in certain environ-
ments. As mentioned, [Vaidya and Clifton, 2005] is the only work that studied privacy
preserving execution of top-k queries. However, their approach is mainly based on the
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k-anonymity privacy policies, therefore, it cannot extended to encrypted databases. Re-
cently, differential privacy [Dwork and Nissim, 2004] has emerged as a powerful model to
protect against unknown adversaries with guaranteed probabilistic accuracy. However,
here we consider encrypted data in the outsourced model; moreover, we do not want
our query answer to be perturbed by noise, but we want our query result to be exact.
Kuzu et. al. [Kuzu et al., 2014] proposed a scheme that leverages DP and leaks obfus-
cated access statistics to enable efficient searching. Another approach has been extensively
studied is order-preserving encryption (OPE) [Agrawal et al., 2004, Popa et al., 2011,
Boldyreva et al., 2011a, Aggarwal and Yu, 2008, Lindell and Pinkas, 2000], which pre-
serves the order of the message. We note that, by definition, OPE directly reveals the
order of the objects’ ranks, thus does not satisfy our data privacy guarantee. Furthermore,
[Hang et al., 2015] proposed a prototype for access control using deterministic proxy en-
cryption, and other secure database systems have been proposed by using embedded secure
hardware, such as TrustedDB [Bajaj and Sion, 2011] and Cipherbase [Arasu et al., 2015].
4.3 Preliminaries
4.3.1 Problem Definition
Consider a data owner that has a database relation R of n objects, denoted by o1, . . . , on,
and each object oi has M attributes. For simplicity, we assume that all M attributes
take numerical values. Thus, the relation R is an n ×M matrix. The data owner would
like to outsource R to a third-party cloud S1 that is completely untrusted. Therefore,
data owner encrypts R and sends the encrypted relation ER to the cloud. After that, any
authorized client should be able to get the results of the top-k query over this encrypted
relation directly from S1, by specifying k and a score function over the M (encrypted)
attributes. We consider the monotone scoring (ranking) functions that are weighted linear
combinations over all attributes, that is FW (o) =
∑
wi×xi(o), where each wi ≥ 0 is a user-
specified weight for the i-th attribute and xi(o) is the local score (value) of the i-th attribute
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for object o. Note that we consider the monotone linear function mainly because it is the
most important and widely used score function on top-k queries [Ilyas et al., 2008]. The
results of a top-k query are the objects with the highest k scores of FW values. For example,
consider an authorized client, Alice, who wants to run a top-k query over the encrypted
relation ER. Consider the following query: q = SELECT * FROM ER ORDER BY FW (·) STOP
AFTER k; That is, Alice wants to get the top-k results based on her scoring function FW ,
for a specified set of weights. Alice first has to request the keys from the data owner, then
generates a query token tk. Alice sends the tk to the cloud server. The cloud server storing
the encrypted database ER processes the top-k query and sends the encrypted results back
to Alice. In the real world scenarios, the authorized clients can locally store the keys for
generating the token.
4.3.2 The Architecture
We consider the secure computation on the cloud under the semi-honest (or honest-but-
curious) adversarial model. Furthermore, our model assumes the existence of two differ-
ent non-colluding semi-honest cloud providers, S1 and S2, where S1 stores the encrypted
database ER and S2 holds the secret keys and provides the crypto services. We refer to
the server S2 as the Crypto Cloud and assume S2 resides in the cloud environment and is
isolated from S1. The two parties S1 and S2 do not trust each other, and therefore, they
have to execute secure computations on encrypted data.
This model is not new and has already been widely used in related
work, such as [Elmehdwi et al., 2014, Bugiel et al., 2011, Liu et al., 2015a,
Baldimtsi and Ohrimenko, 2014, Bost et al., 2015]. As pointed out by these works,
we emphasize that these cloud services are typically provided by some large companies,
such as Amazon, Microsoft Azure, and Google, who have also commercial interests not to
collude. The Crypto Cloud S2 is equipped with a cryptographic processor, which stores
the decryption key. The cryptographic processor has been built and used in real life (e.g.,
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the IBM PCIe4 or the Freescale C29x5). When the server S1 receives the query token, S1
initiates the secure computation protocol with the Crypto Cloud S2. Figure 4.1 shows an
overview of the architecture.
Figure 4.1: An overview of our model
4.3.3 Cryptographic Tools
In Table 4.2 we summarize the notation. In the following, we present the cryptographic
primitives used in our construction.
Paillier Cryptosystem The Paillier cryptosystem [Paillier, 1999] is a semantically se-
cure public key encryption scheme. We describe the algorithm in Chapter 2 The message
space M for the encryption is ZN , where N is a product of two large prime numbers p
and q. For a message m ∈ ZN , we denote Encpk(m) ∈ ZN2 to be the encryption of m with
the public key pk. When the key is clear in the text, we simply use Enc(m) to denote the
encryption of m and Decsk(c) to denote the decryption of a ciphertext c. The details of
encryption and decryption algorithm can be found in [Paillier, 1999]. It has the following
homomorphic properties:
• Addition: ∀x, y ∈ ZN , Enc(x) · Enc(y) = Enc(x+ y)
4http://www-03.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pciecc/overview.shtml
5http://www.freescale.com/webapp/sps/site/prod_summary.jsp?code=C29x
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• Scalar Multiplication: ∀x, a ∈ ZN , Enc(x)a = Enc(a · x)
Generalized Paillier Our construction also relies on Damg˚ard-Jurik(DJ) cryptosystem
introduced by Damg˚ard and Jurik [Damg˚ard and Jurik, 2001], which is a generalization of
Paillier encryption. The message space M expands to ZNs for s ≥ 1, and the ciphertext
space is under the group ZNs+1 . As mentioned in [Adida and Wikstro¨m, 2007], this gen-
eralization allows one to doubly encrypt messages and use the additive homomorphism of
the inner encryption layer under the same secret key. In particular, let E2
(
x
)
denote an
encryption of the DJ scheme for a message x ∈ ZN2 (when s = 2) and Enc(x) be a normal
Paillier encryption. This extension allows a ciphertext of the first layer to be treated as
a plaintext in the second layer. Moreover, this nested encryption preserves the structure
over inner ciphertexts and allows one to manipulate it as follows:
E2
(
Enc(m1)
)Enc(m2) = E2(Enc(m1) · Enc(m2)) = E2(Enc(m1 +m2))
We note that this is the only homomorphic property that our construction relies on.
Throughout this paper, we use ∼ to denote that the underlying plaintext under en-
cryption E are the same, i.e., Enc(x) ∼ Enc(y) ⇒ x = y. We summarize the notation
throughout this paper in Table 4.2. Note that in our application, we need one layered
encryption; that is, given E2
(
Enc(x)
)
, we want a normal Paillier encryption Enc(x). As
introduced in [Baldimtsi and Ohrimenko, 2014], this could simply be done with the help
of S2. However, we need a protocol RecoverEnc to securely remove one layer of encryption.
4.3.4 No-Random-Access (NRA) Algorithm
The NRA algorithm [Fagin et al., 2001] finds the top-k answers by exploiting only sorted
accesses to the relation R. The input to the NRA algorithm is a set of sorted lists S, each
ranks the “same” set of objects based on different attributes. The output is a ranked list
of these objects ordered on the aggregate input scores. We opted to use this algorithm
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Notation Definition
n Size of the relation R, i.e. |R| = n
M Total number of attributes in R
m Total number of attributes for the query q
Enc(m) Paillier encryption of m
Dec(c) Paillier decryption of c
E2
(
m
)
Damg˚ard-Jurik (DJ) encryption of m
Enc(x) ∼ Enc(y) Denotes x = y, i.e. Dec(Enc(x)) = Dec(Enc(y))
EHL(o) Encrypted Hash List of the object o
EHL+(o) Efficient Encrypted Hash List of the object o
	,  EHL and EHL+ operations, see Section 4.5.
Idi The data item in the ith sorted list Li at depth d
E(Idi ) Encrypted data item I
d
i
FW (o) Cost function in the query token
Bd(o) The best score (upper bound) of o at depth d
W d(o) The worst score (lower bound) of o at depth d
Table 4.2: Notation Summarization
Algorithm 6: NRA Algorithm [Fagin et al., 2001]
1 def NRA
(
L1, ..., LM
)
:
2 Do sorted access in parallel to each of the M sorted lists Li. At each depth d:
repeat
3 Maintain the bottom values xd1, x
d
2, ..., x
d
M encountered in the lists;
4 For every object oi compute a lower bound W
d(oi) and upper bound B
d(oi);
5 Let T dk , the current top k list, contain the k objects with the largest W
d(·)
values seen so far (and their grades), and let Mdk be the kth largest lower
bound value, W d(·) in T dk ;
6 Halt and return T dk when at least k distinct objects have been seen (so that
in particular T dk contains k objects) and when B
d(ok) ≤Mdk for all ok /∈ T dk ,
i.e the upper bound for every object who’s not in T dk is no greater than M
d
k .
Otherwise, go to next depth;
7 until;
because it provides a scheme that leaks minimal information to the cloud server (since
during query processing there is no need to access intermediate objects). We assume that
each column (attribute) is sorted independently to create a set of sorted lists S. The set of
sorted lists is equivalent to the original relation, but the objects in each list L are sorted in
ascending order according to their local score (attribute value). After sorting, R contains
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M sorted lists, denoted as S = {L1, L2, . . . , LM}. Each sorted list consists of n data items,
denoted as Li = {I1i , I2i , . . . , Ini }. Each data item is a object/value pair Idi = (odi , xdi ),
where odi and x
d
i are the object id and local score at the depth d (when d objects have
been accessed under sorted access in each list) in the ith sorted list respectively. Since it
produces the top-k answers using bounds computed over their exact scores, NRA may not
report the exact object scores. The score lower bound of some object o, W (o), is obtained
by applying the ranking function on o’s known scores and the minimum possible values
of o’s unknown scores. The score upper bound of o, B(o), is obtained by applying the
ranking function on o’s known scores and the maximum possible values of o’s unknown
scores, which are the same as the last seen scores in the corresponding ranked lists. The
algorithm reports a top-k object even if its score is not precisely known. Specifically, if the
score lower bound of an object o is not below the score upper bounds of all other objects
(including unseen objects), then o can be safely reported as the next top-k object. We give
the details of the NRA in Algorithm 6.
4.4 Scheme Overview
In this section, we give an overview of our scheme. The two non-colluding semi-honest
cloud servers are denoted by S1 and S2. Let SecTopK = (Enc,Token,SecQuery) be the
secure top-k query scheme containing three algorithms Enc, Token and SecQuery. Enc(R)
is the encryption algorithm that takes relation R as an input and outputs the encrypted
relation ER. The idea of Enc is to encrypt and permute the set of sorted lists for R, so that
the server can execute a variation of the NRA algorithm using only sequential accesses to
the encrypted data. To do this encryption, we design a new encrypted data structure for
the objects, called EHL. The Token algorithm takes a query q and produces a token for the
query. The token serves as a trapdoor so that the cloud knows which list to access. Finally,
SecQuery is the query processing algorithm that takes the token and securely computes top-
k results based on the token. As mentioned earlier, our encryption scheme takes advantage
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of the NRA top-k algorithm. In particular, S1 scans the encrypted data depth by depth
for each targeted list, maintaining a list of encrypted top-k object ids per depth until there
are k encrypted object ids that satisfy the NRA halting condition. During this process,
S1 and S2 learn nothing about the underlying scores and objects. At the end of the
protocol, the object ids can be reported to the client. As we discuss next, there are two
options after that. Either the encrypted records are retrieved and returned to the client,
or the client retrieves the records using oblivious RAM [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996]
that does not even reveal the location of the actual encrypted records. In the first case,
the server can get some additional information by observing the access patterns, i.e., the
encrypted results of different queries. However, there are schemes that address this access
leakage [Islam et al., 2012, Kuzu et al., 2014] and is beyond the scope of this paper. The
second approach may be more expensive but is completely secure.
In the following sections, we first discuss the new encrypted data structures EHL and
EHL+. Then, we present the three algorithms Enc, Token and SecQuery in more details.
4.5 Encrypted Hash List (EHL)
In this paper, we propose a new data structure called encrypted hash list (EHL) to encrypt
each object. The main purpose of this structure is to allow the cloud to homomorphically
compute equality between the objects, whereas it is computationally hard for the server
to figure out what the objects are. Intuitively, the idea is that given an object o we use
s Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) to hash the object into a binary list of length H and
then encrypt all the bits in the list to generate EHL. In partilar, we use the secure key-
hash functions HMAC as the PRFs. Let EHL(o) be the encrypted list of an object o and let
EHL(o)[i] denote the ith encryption in the list. In particular, we initialize an empty list EHL
of length H and fill all the entries with 0. First, we generate s secure keys κ1, ..., κs. The
object o is hashed to a list as follows: 1) Set EHL[HMAC(ki, o) mod H] = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
2) Encrypt each bit using Paillier encryption: for 0 ≤ j ≤ H − 1, Enc(EHL(o)[j]). Fig. 4.2
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shows how we obtain EHL(o) for the object o.
Secret Keys: k1, …, kS 
…
…
EHL(o):
HMAC (k1,o ) HMAC (k2,o ) HMAC (k S , o)
HMAC (k 1,o)%H HMAC (k 2,o)%H HMAC (k S , o)%H
E(0) E(1) E(0) E(0) E(1) … ... E(1)
0 1 2 H-1…      ...
o
Figure 4.2: Encrypted Hash List for the object o.
Lemma 4.5.1. Given two objects o1 and o2, their EHL(o1) and EHL(o2) are computation-
ally indistinguishable.
It is obvious to see that Lemma 4.5.1 holds since the bits in the EHL are encrypted by
the semantically secure Paillier encryption scheme. Given EHL(x) and EHL(y), we define
the randomized operation 	 between EHL(x) and EHL(y) as follows:
EHL(x)	 EHL(y) def=
H−1∏
i=0
(
EHL(x)[i] · EHL(y)[i]−1)ri (4.1)
where each ri is some random value in ZN .
Lemma 4.5.2. Let Enc(b) = EHL(x) 	 EHL(y). Then the plaintext b = 0 if x = y
(two objects are the same), otherwise b is uniformly distributed in the group ZN with high
probability.
Proof Sketch: Let Enc(xi) = EHL(x)[i] and Enc(yi) = EHL(y)[i]. If x = y, i.e. they are
the same objects, then for all i ∈ [0, H − 1], xi = yi. Therefore,
H−1∏
i=0
(EHL(x)[i] · EHL(y)[i]−1)ri = E(H−1∑
i=0
(ri(xi − yi))
)
= Enc(0)
In the case of x 6= y, it must be true, with high probability, that there exists some i ∈
[0, H − 1] such that Enc(xi)  Enc(yi), i.e. the underlying bit at location i in EHL(x) is
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different from the bit in EHL(y). Suppose EHL(x)[i] = Enc(1) and EHL(y)[i] = Enc(0).
Therefore, the following holds:
(
EHL(x)[i] · EHL(y)[i]−1)ri = Enc(ri(1− 0)) = Enc(ri)
Hence, based on the definition 	, it follows that b becomes random value uniformly dis-
tributed in the group ZN . 
It is worth noting that one can also use BGN cryptosystem for the similar operations
above, as the BGN scheme can homomorphically evaluate quadratic functions (see Chap-
ter 2).
False Positive Rate. Note that the construction is indeed a probabilistically encrypted
Bloom Filter except that we use one list for each object and encrypt each bit in the list.
The construction of EHL may report some false positive results for its 	 operation, i.e.
Enc(0) ← EHL(x) 	 EHL(y) when x 6= y. This is due to the fact that x and y may be
hashed to exactly the same locations using s many HMACs. Therefore, it is easy to see that
the false positive rate (FPR) is the same as the FPR of the Bloom Filter, where we can
choose the number of hash functions HMAC s to be Hn ln 2 to minimize the false positive rate
to be (1 − (1 − 1H
sn
))s ≈ (1 − e−sn/H)s ≈ 0.62H/n. To reduce the false positive rate, we
can increase the length of the list H. However, this will increase the cost of the structure
both in terms of space overhead and number of operations for the randomization operation
which is O(H). In the next subsection, we introduce a more compact and space-efficient
encrypted data structure EHL+.
EHL+. We now present a computation- and space-efficient encrypted hash list EHL+.
The idea of the efficient EHL+ is to first ‘securely hash’ the object o to a larger space
s times and only encrypt those hash values. Therefore, for the operation 	, we only
homomorphically subtract those hashed values. The complexity now reduces to O(s) as
opposed to O(H), where s is the number of the secure hash functions used. We show that
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one can get negligible false positive rate even using a very small s. To create an EHL+(o)
for an object o, we first generate s secure keys k1, ..., ks, then initialize a list EHL
+ of size s.
We first compute oi ← HMAC(ki, o) mod N for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. This step maps o to an element in
the group ZN , i.e. the message space for Paillier encryption. Then set EHL+[i]← Enc(oi)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. The operation 	 between EHL+(x) and EHL+(y) are similar defined as in
Equation(4.1), i.e. EHL+(x)	EHL+(y) def= ∏s−1i=0 (EHL(x)[i] ·EHL(y)[i]−1)ri , where each ri
is some randomly generated value in ZN . Similarly, EHL+ has the same properties as EHL.
Let Enc(b) ← EHL+(x) 	 EHL+(y), b = 0 if x = y and otherwise b is random in ZN with
high probability.
We now analyze the false positive rate (FPR) for EHL+. The false positive answer occurs
when x 6= y and Enc(0)← EHL+(x)	 EHL+(y). That is HMAC(ki, x)%N = HMAC(ki, y)%N
for each i ∈ [1, s]. Assuming HMAC is a Pseudo-Random Function, the probability of this
happens is at most 1Ns . Taking the union bound gives that the FPR is at most
(
n
2
)
1
Ns ≤ n
2
Ns .
Notice that N ≈ 2λ is large number as N is the product of two large primes p and q in
the Paillier encryption and λ is the security parameter. For instance, if we set N to be a
256 bit number (128-bit primes in Paillier) and set s = 4 or 5, then the FPR is negligible
even for millions of records. In addition, the size of the EHL+ is much smaller than EHL
as it stores only s encryptions. In the following section, we simply say EHL to denote the
encrypted hash list using the EHL+ structure.
Notation. We introduce some notation that we use in our construction. Let x =
(x1, . . . , xs) ∈ ZsN and let the encryption Enc(x) denotes the concatenation of the en-
cryptions Enc(x1)...Enc(xs). Also, we denote by  the block-wise multiplication between
Enc(x) and EHL(y); that is, c ← Enc(x)  EHL(y), where ci ← Enc(xi) · EHL(y)[i] for
i ∈ [1, s].
66
4.6 Database Encryption
We describe the database encryption procedure Enc in this section. Given a relation R
with M attributes, the data owner first encrypts the relation using Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7: Enc(R): Relation encryption
1 Given the relation R, sort each Li based on the attribute’s value for 1 ≤ i ≤M ;
2 Generate a public/secret key pkp, skp for the Paillier encryption scheme and random
secret keys κ1, . . . , κs for EHL;
3 Do sorted access in parallel to each of the M sorted lists Li;
4 foreach data item Ii = 〈odi , xdi 〉 ∈ Li do
5 foreach depth d do
6 Compute EHL(odi ) using the keys κ1, . . . , κs;
7 Compute Encpkp(x
d
i ) using pkp;
8 Store the item E(Idi ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Encpkp(xdi 〉) at depth d;
9 Generate a secret key K for a pseudorandom permutation P and permute all the
list based on g. For 1 ≤ i ≤M , permute Li as LPK(i);
10 The data owner securely uploads the keys pkp, skp to the S2, and only pkp to S1;
11 Finally, each permuted list contains a list of encrypted item of the form
E(Id) = 〈EHL(od),Encpkp(xd)〉. Output all lists of encrypted items as the encrypted
relation as ER;
In ER each data item Idi = (o
d
i , x
d
i ) at depth d in the sorted list Li is encrypted as
E(Idi ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Encpkp(xdi )〉. As all the score has been encrypted under the public key
pkp, for the rest of the paper, we simply use Enc(x) to denote the encryption Encpkp(x)
under the public key pkp. Besides the size of the database and M , the encrypted ER doesn’t
reveal anything. In Theorem 4.6.1, we demonstrate this by showing that two encrypted
databases are indistinguishable if they have the same size and number of attributes. We
denote |R| by the size of a relation R.
Theorem 4.6.1. Given two relations R1 and R2 with |R1| = |R2| and same number of
attributes. The encrypted ER1 and ER2 output by the algorithm Enc are indistinguishable.
The proof is straight forward as it’s easy to see that the theorem holds based on
Lemma 4.5.1 and Paillier encryption scheme.
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4.7 Query Token
Consider the SQL-like query q = SELECT * FROM ER ORDERED BY FW (·) STOP BY k, where
FW (·) is a weighted linear combination of all attributes. In this paper, to simplify our
presentation of the protocol, we consider binary weights and therefore the scoring function
is just a sum of the values of a subset of attributes. However, notice that for non {0, 1}
weights the client should provide these weights to the server and the server can simply adapt
the same techniques by using the scalar multiplication property of the Paillier encryption
before it performs the rest of the protocol which we discuss next. The Token algorithm
is quite simple and works as follows: the client specifies the scoring attribute set M of
size m, i.e. |M| = m ≤ M , then requests the key K from the data owner, where K
is the key corresponds the Pseudo Random Permutation P . Then the client computes
the PK(i) for each i ∈ M and sends the following query token to the cloud server S1:
tk = SELECT * FROM ER ORDERED BY {PK(i)}i∈M STOP BY k.
4.8 Top-k Query Processing
As mentioned, our query processing protocol is based on the NRA algorithm. However,
the technical difficulty is to execute the algorithm on the encrypted data while S1 does
not learn any object id or any score and attribute value of the data. We incorporate sev-
eral cryptographic protocols to achieve this. Our query processing uses two state-of-the-
art efficient and secure protocols: EncSort introduced by [Baldimtsi and Ohrimenko, 2014]
and EncCompare introduced by [Bost et al., 2015] as building blocks. We skip the de-
tailed description of these two protocols since they are not the focus of this paper.
Here we only describe their functionalities: 1). EncSort: S1 has a list of encrypted
keyed-value pairs (Enc(key1),Enc(a1))...(Enc(keym),Enc(am)) and a public key pk, and
S2 has the secret key sk. At the end of the protocol, S1 obtains a list new encryp-
tions (Enc(key′1),Enc(a′1))...(Enc(key′m),Enc(a′m)), where the key/value list is sorted based
on the order a′1 ≤ a′2... ≤ a′m and the set {(key1, a1), ..., (keym, am)} is the same as
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{(key′1, a′1), ..., (key′m, a′m)}. 2). EncCompare(Enc(a),Enc(b)): S1 has a public key pk and
two encrypted values Enc(a),Enc(b), while S2 has the secret key sk. At the end of the pro-
tocol, S1 obtains the bit f such that f := (a ≤ b). Several protocols have been proposed
for the functionality above. We choose the one from [Bost et al., 2015] mainly because it
is efficient and perfectly suits our requirements.
4.8.1 Query Processing: SecQuery
We first give the overall description of the top-k query processing SecQuery at a high level.
Then in Chapter 4.8.2, we describe in details the secure sub-routines that we use in the
query processing: SecWorst, SecBest, SecDedup, and SecUpdate.
As mentioned, SecQuery makes use of the NRA algorithm but is different from the
original NRA, because SecQuery cannot maintain the global worst/best scores in plaintext.
Instead, SecQuery has to run secure protocols depth by depth and homomorphically com-
pute the worst/best scores based on the items at each depth. It then has to update the
complete list of encrypted items seen so far with their global worst/best scores. At the
end, server S1 reports k encrypted objects (or object ids) without learning any object or
its scores.
Notations. In the encrypted database, we denote each encrypted item by E(I) =
〈EHL(o),Enc(x)〉, where I is the item with object id o and score x. During the query
processing, the server S1 needs to maintain the encrypted item with its current best/worst
scores, and we denote by E(I) = (EHL(o),Enc(W ),Enc(B)) the encrypted score item I
with object id o with best score B and worst score W .
In particular, upon receiving the query token tk = SELECT * FROM ER ORDERED BY
{PK(i)}i∈M STOP BY k, the cloud server S1 begins to process the query. The token tk con-
tains {PK(i)}i∈M which informs S1 to perform the sequential access to the lists {LPK(i)}i∈M.
By maintaining an encrypted list T , which includes items with their encrypted global best
and worst scores, S1 updates the list T depth by depth. Let T
d be the state of the en-
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Algorithm 8: Top-k Query Processing: SecQuery
1 S1 receives Token from the client;
2 Parses the Token and let Li = LPK(j) for j ∈ M;
3 foreach depth d at each list do
4 foreach E(Idi ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Enc(xdi )〉 ∈ Li do
/* Compute the worst score for object odi at current depth d */
5 Compute Enc(W di ))← SecWorst(E(Idi ), H, pkp, skp), where H =
{E(Idj )}j∈m,i 6=j ;
/* Compute the best score for object odi at current depth d */
6 Compute Enc(Bdi )← SecBest(E(Idi ), {j}j 6=i, pkp, skp);
/* gets encrypted list Γd without duplicated objects */
7 Run Γd ← SecDedup({E(Idi )}, pkp, skp) with S2 and get the local encrypted list
Γd;
8 Run T d ← SecUpdate(T d−1,Γd, pkp, skp) with S2 and get T d;
9 If |T d| < k elements, go to the next depth. Otherwise, run EncSort(T d) by
sorting on Enc(Wi), get first k items as T
d
k ;
10 Let the kth and the (k + 1)th item be E(I ′k) and E(I
′
k+1), S1 then runs
f ← EncCompare(E(W ′k), E(B′k+1)) with S2, where E(W ′k) is the worst score for
E(I ′k), and E(B
′
k+1) is the best score for E(I
′
k+1) in T
d;
11 if f = 0 then
12 Halt and return the encrypted first k item in T dk
crypted list T after depth d. At depth d, S1 first homomorphically computes the local
encrypted worst/best scores for each item appearing at this depth by running SecWorst
and SecBest.
In SecWorst, S1 takes the input of the current encrypted item E(I
d
i ) =
〈EHL(odi ),Enc(xdi )〉 and all of the encrypted items in other lists H at current depth, i.e.,
H = {E(Idj )}j 6=i,j∈M. S1 runs the protocol SecWorst with S2, and obtains the encrypted
worst score for the object odi . Similarly, in the protocol SecBest, S1 takes the input of
the current encrypted item E(Idi ) = 〈EHL(odi ),Enc(xdi )〉 and the list pointers {j}j 6=i that
indicates all of the encrypted item seen so far. S1 runs the protocol SecBest with S2,
and obtains the encrypted worst score for the object odi . Then S1 securely replaces the
duplicated encrypted objects with large encrypted worst scores Z by running SecDedup
with S2. In the SecDedup protocol, S1 inputs the current encrypted items, {E(Idi )}, seen
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so far. After the execution of the protocol, S1 gets list of encrypted items Γd such that
there are no duplicated objects. Next, S1 updates the encrypted global list from state
T d−1 to state T d by applying SecUpdate. After that, S1 utilizes EncSort to sort the distinct
encrypted objects with their scores in T d to obtain the first k encrypted objects which are
essentially the top-k objects based on their worst scores so far. The protocol halts if at
some depth, the encrypted best score of the (k+1)-th object, Enc(Bk+1), is less than the
k-th object’s encrypted worst score Enc(Wk). This can be checked by calling the protocol
EncCompare(Enc(Wk),Enc(Bk+1)). Followed by underlying NRA algorithm, it is easy to
see that S1 can correctly reports the encrypted top-k objects. We describe the detailed
query processing in Algorithm 8.
4.8.2 Building Blocks
In this section, we present the detailed description of the protocols SecWorst, SecBest,
SecDedup, and SecUpdate.
4.8.2.1 Secure Worst Score
At each depth, for each encrypted data item, server S1 should obtain the encryption
Enc(W ), which is the worst score based on the items at the current depth only. Note
that this is different than the normal NRA algorithm as it computes the global worst pos-
sible score for each encountered objects until the current depth. We formally describe the
protocol setup below:
Protocol 4.8.1. Server S1 has the input E(I) = 〈EHL(o),Enc(x)〉, a set of encrypted
items H, i.e. H = {E(Ii)}i=[|H|], where E(Ii) = 〈EHL(oi),Enc(xi)〉, and the public key
pkp. Server S2’s inputs are pkp and skp. SecWorst securely computes the encrypted worst
ranking score based on L, i.e., S1 outputs Enc(W (o)), where W (o) is the worst score based
on the list H.
The technical challenge here is to homomorphically evaluate the encrypted score only
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based on the objects’ equality relation. That is, if the object is the same as another o from
L, then we add the score to Enc(W (o)), otherwise, we don’t. However, we want to prevent
the servers from knowing the relations between the objects at any depth. We overcome
this problem using the protocol SecWorst(E(I), L) between the two servers S1 and S2. We
present the detailed protocol description of SecWorst in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9: SecWorst
(
E(I), H = {E(Ii)}i∈[|H|], pkp, skp
)
: Worst Score Protocol
S1’s input: E(I), H = {E(Ij)}, pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Let |H| = m. Generate a random permutation pi : [m]→ [m];
3 For the set of encrypted items H = {E(Ij)}, permute each E(Ij) in H as
E(Ipi(j)) = EHL(opi(j)),Enc(xpi(j)).;
4 for each permuted item in E(Ipi(j)) do
5 compute Enc(bj)← EHL(o)	 EHL(opi(j)), send Enc(bj) to S2
6 Receive E2
(
ti
)
from S2 and evaluate:
E2
(
Enc(x′i)
)
:= E2
(
ti
)Enc(xi) · (E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0);
7 Run Enc(x′i)← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(x′i)
)
, pkp, skp) with S2;
8 Set the worst score Enc(W )← (∏mi=1 Enc(x′i)) ;
9 Output Enc(W ).
10 Server S2:
11 for each Enc(bi) received from S1 do
12 Decrypt to get bi, set ti ← (bi = 0 ? 1 : 0);
13 Send E2
(
ti
)
to S1.
Intuitively, the idea of SecWorst is that S1 first generates a random permutation pi and
permutes the list of items in L. Then, it computes the Enc(bi) between E(I) and each
permuted E(Ipi(i)), and sends Enc(bi) to S2. The random permutation prevents S2 from
knowing the pair-wise relations between o and the rest of the objects oi’s. Then S2 sends
E2
(
ti
)
to S1 (line 13). Based on Lemma 4.5.2, ti = 1 if two objects are the same, otherwise
ti = 0. S1 then computes E2
(
Enc(x′i)
) ← E2(ti)Enc(xi) · (E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0). Based on the
properties of DJ Encryption,
E2
(
ti
)Enc(xi) · (E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0) = E2(ti · Enc(xi) + (1− ti) · Enc(0)) = E2(Enc(x′i))
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Therefore, it follows that x′i = 0 if ti = 0, otherwise x
′
i = xi. S1 then runs
RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(x′i)
)
, pkp, skp) (describe in Algorithm 10) to get Enc(x
′
i). Note that
the protocol RecoverEnc is also used in other protocols. Finally, S1 evaluates the following
equation: Enc(W (o)) ← ∏mi=1 Enc(x′i). S1 can correctly evaluate the worst score, because
that, when ti = 0, the object oi is not the same as o, otherwise, ti = 1. The following
formula gives the correct computation of the worst score:
m∏
i=1
Enc(x′i) = Enc(
m∑
i=1
x′i), where x
′
i =

xi if oi = o
0 otherwise
Algorithm 10: RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(c)
)
, pkp, skp) Recover Encryption
S1’s input: E
2
(
Enc(c)
)
, pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Generate r
$←− ZN , compute and send E2
(
Enc(c+ r)
)← E2(Enc(c))Enc(r) to S2.
3 Server S2:
4 Decrypt as Enc(c+ r) and send back to S1
5 Server S1:
6 Receive Enc(c+ r) and compute: Enc(c) = Enc(c+ r) · Enc(r)−1;
7 Output Enc(c).
Note that nothing has been leaked to S1 at the end of the protocol. However, there is
some leakage function revealed to S2 at current depth, which we will describe it in detail
in later section. However, even by learning this pattern, S2 has still no idea on which
particular item is the same as the other at this depth since S1 randomly permutes the item
before sending to S2 and everything has been encrypted. Moreover, no information has
been leaked on the objects’ scores.
73
4.8.2.2 Secure Best Score
The secure computation for the best score is different from computing the worst score.
Below we describe the protocol SecBest between S1 and S2:
Protocol 4.8.2. Server S1 takes the inputs of the public key pkp, E(I) = 〈EHL(o),Enc(x)〉
for the object o in list Li, and a set of pointers P = {j}i 6=j,j∈M to the list in ER. Server
S2’s inputs are pkp, skp. The protocol SecBest securely computes the encrypted best score
at the current depth d, i.e., S1 finally outputs Enc(B(o)), where B(o) is the best score for
the o at current depth.
Algorithm 11: SecBest
(
E(Ii),P, pkp, skp
)
Secure Best Score.
S1’s input: E(Ii) in list Li, P = {j}i 6=j , pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 foreach list Li do
3 maintain Enc(xdi ) for Li, where Enc(x
d
i ) is the encrypted score at depth d.
4 Generate a random permutation pi : [l]→ [l];
5 Permute each Li as Lpi(i) = EHL(opi(i)),Enc(xpi(i));
6 foreach permuted E(Ipi(i)) do
7 compute Enc(bi)← EHL(o)	 EHL(oi)
8 send Enc(bi) to S2 receive E
2
(
ti
)
and compute:
E2
(
Enc(x′i)
)
:= E2
(
ti
)Enc(xi) · (E2(1)E2(ti)−1)Enc(0);
9 run Enc(x′i)← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(x′i)
)
, pkp, skp) with S2;
10 compute E2
(
Enc(x′di )
)←(1−∏di=1 E2(ti))Enc(xdi );
11 run Enc(x′di )←RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(x′di )
)
, pkp, skp) with S2;
12 set Enc(Bi)← Enc(x′di ) · (
∏l
i=1 Enc(x
′
i));
13 compute Enc(B)←∏mi=1 Enc(Bi) and output Enc(B);
14 Server S2:
15 for Enc(bi) received from S1 do
16 Decrypt to get bi. If bi = 0, set ti = 1, otherwise, set ti = 0;
17 Send E2
(
ti
)
to S1.
At depth d, let E(I) be the encrypted item in the list Li, then its best score up to
this depth is based on the whether this item has appeared in other lists {Lj}j 6=i,j∈M. The
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detailed description for SecBest is described in Algorithm 11.
In SecBest, S1 has to scan the encrypted items in the other lists to securely evaluate
the current best score for the encrypted E(I). The last seen encrypted item in each sorted
list contains the encryption of the best possible values (or bottom scores). If the same
object o appears in the previous depth then homomorphically adds the object’s score to
the encrypted best score Enc(B), otherwise adds the bottom scores seen so far to Enc(B).
In particular, S1 can homomorphically evaluate (at line 9): E
2
(
x′i
)
= E2
(
ti · Enc(xi) + (1−
ti) · Enc(0)
)
. That is, if ti = 0 which means item I appeared in the previous depth, x
′
i will
be assigned the corresponding score xi, otherwise, x
′
i = 0. Similarly, S1 homomorphically
evaluates the following: Enc(x′di )) = Enc((1−
∑d
i ti) · xdi ). If the item I does not appear in
the previous depth, then (1 −∑di ti) = 1 since each ti = 0, therefore, x′di will be assigned
to the bottom value xdi . Finally, S1 homomorphically add up all the encrypted scores and
get the encrypted best scores (line 12).
4.8.2.3 Secure Deduplication
At each depth, some of the objects might be repeatedly computed since the same objects
may appear in different sorted list at the same depth. S1 cannot identify duplicates since
the items and their scores are probabilistically encrypted. We now present a protocol that
deduplicates the encrypted objects in the following.
Protocol 4.8.3. Let the E(I) be an encrypted scored item such that E(I) =
(EHL(o),Enc(W ),Enc(B)), i.e. the E(I) is associated with EHL(oi), its encrypted worst
and best score Enc(Wi), Enc(Bi). Assuming that S1’s inputs are the public key pkp, a set
of encrypted scored items Q = {E(Ii)}i∈[|Q|]}. Server S2 has the public key pkp and the
secret key skp. The execution of the protocol SecDedup between S1 and S2 enables S1 to get
a new list of encrypted distinct objects and their scores, that is, at the end of the protocol,
S1 outputs a new list of items E(I
′
1), ...,E(I
′
l), and there does not exist i, j ∈ [l] with i 6= j
such that oi = oj. Moreover, the new encrypted list should not affect the final top-k results.
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Algorithm 12: SecDedup
(
Q = {E(Ii)}i∈[|Q|], pkp, skp
)
: De-duplication Protocol
S1’s input: E(I1), . . . ,E(Il), pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
S1’s ouput: Output E(I
′
1) . . .E(I
′
l) without duplicated objects
1 Server S1:
2 Let |Q| = l;
3 for i = 1 . . . l do
4 for j = i+ 1, . . . , l do
5 Compute Enc(bij)←
(
EHL(oi)	 EHL(oj)
)
;
6 Set the symmetric matrix B such that Bij = Enc(bij);
7 S1 generate it own public/private key (pk
′, sk′);
8 for each E(Ii) do
9 Generate random αi ∈ ZkN , βi, γi ∈ ZN ;
10 Compute E(I˜i) = (EHL(o˜i),Enc(W˜i),Enc(B˜i))← Rand(E(Ii),αi, βi, γi);
11 Compute Hi = Encpk′(αi)||Encpk′(βi)||Encpk′(γi) using pk′;
12 Generate a random permutation pi : [l]→ [l];
13 Permute pi(B), i.e. permute Bpi(i)pi(j) for each Bij ;
14 Permute E(I˜pi(i)) and Hpi(i) for i ∈ [1, l];
15 Send pi(B), {E(I˜pi(i))}li=1, {Hpi(i)}li=1, pk′ to S2;
16 Server S2:
17 Receive pi(B), {E(I˜pi(i))}li=1, {Hpi(i)}li=1, and pk′ from S1;
18 for upper triangle of pi(B) do
19 decrypt bpi(i)pi(j) := Decskp(Bpi(i)pi(j));
20 if bpi(i)pi(j) = 0 then
21 remove E(I˜pi(i)), Hpi(i);
/* Deduplicate items */
22 randomly generate oi, and αi ∈ ZkN , βi, γi ∈ ZN ;
23 set Wi = Z + βi and BI = Z + γi, where Z = N − 1 ;
24 Set E(I ′pi(i)) := (EHL(o) Enc(αi),Enc(Wi),Enc(Bi));
25 Compute H ′pi(i) ← Encpk′(αi)||Encpk′(βi)||Encpk′(γi) using pk′;
26 for remaining Enc(I˜pi(j)), Hpi(j) do
27 generate random α′i ∈ ZkN , β′i, and γ′i ∈ ZN ;
28 Enc(I ′i) = (EHL(o
′
i),Enc(W
′
i ),Enc(B
′
i))← Rand(Enc(I˜pi(j)),α′i, β′i, γ′i);
29 Hpi(j) = Encpk′(αpi(j)),Encpk′(βpi(j)),Encpk′(γpi(j));
30 set H ′i = Encpk′(αpi(j)) ·Encpk′(α′i)||Encpk′(βpi(j)) ·Encpk′(β′i)||Encpk′(γpi(j)) ·Encpk′(γ′i);
31 Generate a random permutation pi′ : [l]→ [l]. Permute new list E(Ipi′(i)) and H ′pi′(i),
then send them back to S1;
32 Server S1:
33 Decrypt each H ′pi′(i) as α
′
pi′(i), β
′
pi′(i), γ
′
pi′(i) using sk
′;
34 foreach E(I ′pi′(i)) = EHL(o
′
pi′(i)),Enc(W
′
pi′(i)),Enc(B
′
pi′(i)) do
35 Run and get
Enc(Iˆi) = (EHL(oˆi),Enc(Ŵi),Enc(B̂i))← Rand(Enc(I ′pi′(i)),−α′pi′(i),−β′pi′(i),−γ′pi′(i));
36 Output the encrypted list E(Iˆ1)...E(Iˆl);
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Algorithm 13: Rand
(
E(I),α, β, γ
)
: Blinding the randomness
1 Let E(I) = (EHL(o),Enc(B),Enc(W ));
2 Compute E(α),Enc(β),Enc(γ);
3 Compute EHL(o)← EHL(o) Enc(α), Enc(W )← Enc(W ) · Enc(β), and
Enc(B)← Enc(B) · Enc(γ);
4 Output E(I ′) = (EHL(o),Enc(W ),Enc(B));
Algorithm 14: A Secure Update Protocol SecUpdate
(
T d−1,Γd, pkp, skp
)
S1’s input: pkp, T
d−1, Γd (encrypted list without duplicated objects)
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Permute E(Ii) ∈ Γd as E(Ipi(i)) based on random permutation pi;
3 foreach each permute E(Ipi(i)) do
4 foreach each E(Ij) ∈ T d−1 do
5 Let Enc(Wi), Enc(Bi) be encrypted worst/best score in E(Ipi(i)) , and let
Enc(Wj),Enc(Bj) be encrypted worst/best score in E(Ij);
6 Compute Enc(bij)← EHL(Ipi(i))	 EHL(Ij), send Enc(bij) to S2 and get
E2
(
tij
)
;
7 Compute E2
(
Enc(W ′i )
)← E2(tij)Enc(Wi),
Enc(W ′i )← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(W ′i )
)
, pkp, skp),
Enc(W ′j)← Enc(Wj)Enc(W ′i );
8 Compute E2
(
Enc(B′j)
)← E2(tij)Enc(Bi) (E2(1)E2(tij)−1)Enc(Bj)
Enc(B′j)← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(B′j)
)
, pkp, skp);
9 Set Enc(W ′j),Enc(B
′
j) as the updated score for Enc(Ij);
10 compute E2
(
Enc(W ′i )
)← E2(tij)Enc(Wi)(E2(1)E2(tij)−1)Enc(W ′j), run
Enc(W ′i )← RecoverEnc(E2
(
Enc(W ′i )
)
, pkp, skp) and maintain Enc(W
′
i ) for
each E(Ipi(i))
11 Update the encrypted worst score to Enc(W ′i ) for each Enc(Ipi(i)) and keep
the original best score Enc(Bi);
12 Append the updated Enc(Ipi(i)) to T
d−1 and get T d;
13 S1 and S2 execute SecDedup(T
d, pkp, skp) and get the updated list T
d;
14 S1 finally outputs T
d.
15 Server S2:
16 foreach Enc(bi) received from S1 do
17 Decrypt to get bi;
18 If bi = 0, set ti = 1, otherwise, set ti = 0. Send E
2
(
ti
)
to S1.
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Intuitively, at a high level, SecDedup let S2 obliviously find the duplicated objects and
its scores, and replaces the object id with a random value and its score with a large enough
value Z = N − 1 ∈ ZN (the largest value in the message space) such that, after sorting the
worst scores, it will definitely not appear in the top-k list.
Figure 4.3: Overview of the SecDedup protocol
Figure 4.3 gives the overview of our approach. The technical challenge here is to allow
S2 to find the duplicated objects without letting S1 know which objects have been changed.
The idea is to let the server S1 send a encrypted permuted matrix B, which describes the
pairwise equality relations between the objects in the list. S1 then use the same permutation
to permute the list of blinded encrypted items before sending it to S2. This prevents S2
from knowing the original data. For the duplicated objects, S2 replace the scores with a
large enough encrypted worst score. On the other hand, after deduplication, S2 also has
to blind the data items as well to prevent S1 from knowing which items are the duplicated
ones. S1 finally gets the encrypted items without duplication. Algorithm 12 describes the
detailed protocol.
We briefly discuss the execution of the protocol as follows: S1 first fill the entry Bij
by computing EHL(oi) 	 EHL(oj). Note that, since the encrypted B is symmetric matrix
indicating the equality relations for the list, therefore, S1 only need fill the upper triangular
for B. and lower triangular can be filled by the fact that Bij = Bji. In addition, S1 blinds
78
the encrypted item Enc(Ii) by homomorphically adding random values and get Enc(I˜i).
This prevents S2 from knowing the values of the item since S2 has the secret key. Moreover,
S1 encrypts the randomnesses using his own public key pk
′ and get Hi. To hide the relation
pattern between the objects in the list, S1 applies a random permutation pi to the matrix
Bpi(i)pi(j), as well as Enc(Ipi(i)) and Hpi(i). Receiving the ciphertext, S2 only needs to decrypt
the upper triangular of the matrix, S2 only keeps one copy of the Enc(I˜pi(i)), Hpi(i) and
Enc(I˜pi(j)), Hpi(j) if bpi(i)pi(j) = 0. Without loss of generality, we keep Enc(I˜pi(j)), Hpi(j) and
replace Enc(I˜pi(i)), Hpi(i) as line 22-25. For the unchanged item, S2 blinds them using as
well (see line 28-30). It worth noting that the randomnesses added by S2 are to prevent
S1 from discovering which item has been changed or not. S2 also randomly permute the
list as well (line 31). S1 homomorphically recovers the original values by decrypting the
received H ′pi′(i) using his sk
′ (see line 35). S1 eventually the new permuted list of encrypted
items.
For the duplicated objects, the protocol replaces their object id with a random value,
and its worst score with a large number Z. For the new encrypted items that S2 replaced
(line 22), Enc(Iˆi) = (EHL(oˆi),Enc(Ŵi),Enc(B̂i)), we show in the following that Enc(Ŵi) is
indeed a new encryption of the permuted Enc(Wpi′(pi(j))) for some j ∈ [l]. As we can see,
the Enc(Ŵi) is permuted by S2’s random pi
′, i.e. Enc(Ŵpi′(i)) (see line 31). Hence, it follows
that:
Enc(Ŵpi′(i)) ∼ Enc
(
W ′pi′(i) − β′pi′(i)
)
(4.2)
∼ Enc(W ′pi′(i) − (βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i))) (4.3)
∼ Enc(W˜pi′(pi(j)) + βpi′(pi(j)) − (βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i))) (4.4)
∼ Enc(Wpi′(pi(j))) + βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i) − (βpi′(pi(j)) + β′pi′(i))) (4.5)
∼ Enc(Wpi′(pi(j))) (4.6)
In particular, from Algorithm 12, we can see that Equation (4.2) holds due to line 35,
Equation (4.3) holds since line 30 and 33, Equation (4.4) holds due to line 28, and Equa-
tion (4.5) holds because of line 10. On the other hand, for the duplicated items that S1
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has changed from line 22 to 25, by the homomorphic operations of S1 at line 35, we have
Enc(Ŵpi′(k)) ∼ Enc(W ′pi′(k) − β′pi′(k)) ∼ Enc(Z + β′pi′(k) − β′pi′(k)) ∼ Enc(Z)
Since Z is a very large enough number, this randomly generated objects definitely do not
appear in the top-k list after sorting.
4.8.2.4 Secure Update
At each depth d, we need to update the current list of objects with the latest global
worst/best scores. At a high level, S1 has to update the encrypted list Γ
d from the state
T d−1 (previous depth) to T d, and appends the new encrypted items at this depth. Let
Γd be the list of encrypted items with the encrypted worst/best scores S1 get at depth d.
Specifically, for each encrypted item E(Ii) ∈ T d−1 and each E(Ij) ∈ Ld at depth d, we
update Ii’s worst score by adding the worst from Ij and replace its best score with Ij ’s
best score if Ii = Ij since the worst score for Ij is the in-depth worst score and best score
for Ij is the most updated best score. If Ii 6= Ij , we then simply append E(Ij) with its
scores to the list. Finally, we get the fresh T d after depth d. We describe the SecUpdate
protocol in Algorithm 14.
4.9 Security Discussion
In this thesis, we do not provide a proof of security for SecTopK = (Enc,Token, SecQuery)
and leave it as future work. In particular, since our non-colluding two-server model is
different than the standard model considered from searchable and structured encryption,
a provable security treatment of our protocol requires new definitions against which to
prove security. Intuitively, however, the security guarantee our protocol should achieve is
that the encrypted database and query processing protocol should reveal no information
about the plaintext database and queries to either server (S1 or S2) beyond some well-
specified and reasonable leakage. It remains an interesting and important open question
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to mathematically formalize such a notion and prove that our protocol satisfies it.
4.10 Query Optimization
In this section, we present some optimizations that improve the performance of our proto-
col. The optimizations are two-fold: 1) we optimize the efficiency of the protocol SecDedup
at the expense of some additional privacy leakage, and 2) we propose batch processing of
SecDupElim and EncSort to further improve the SecQuery.
4.10.1 Efficient SecDupElim
We now introduce the efficient protocol SecDupElim that provides similar functionality
as SecDedup. Recall that, at each depth, S1 runs SecDedup to deduplicate m encrypted
objects, then after the execution of SecDedup S1 still receives m items but without dupli-
cation, and add these m objects to the list T d when running SecUpdate. Therefore, when
we execute the costly sorting algorithm EncSort the size of list to sort has md elements at
depth d.
The idea for SecDupElim is that instead of keeping the same number encrypted items
m, SecDupElim eliminates the duplicated objects. In this way, the number of encrypted
objects gets reduced, especially if there are many duplicated objects. The SecDupElim
can be obtained by simply changing the SecDedup as follows: in Algorithm 12 at line 20,
when S2 observes that there exist duplicated objects, S2 only keeps one copy of them. The
algorithm works exactly the same as before but without performing the line 22-25. We
also run SecDupElim instead of SecDedup at line 13 in the SecUpdate. That is, after secure
update, we only keep the distinct objects with updated scores. Thus, the number of items
to be sorted also decrease. Now by adapting SecDupElim, if there are many duplicated
objects appear in the list, we have much fewer encrypted items to sort.
Remark on security. The SecDupElim leaks additional information to the server S1.
S1 learns the uniqueness pattern UP
d(qi) at depth d, where UP
d(qi) denotes the number
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of the unique objects that appear at current depth d. The distinct encrypted values at
depth d are independent from all other depths, therefore, this protocol still protects the
distribution of the original ER. In addition, due to the ‘re-encryptions’ during the execution
of the protocol, all the encryptions are fresh ones, i.e., there are not as the same as the
encryptions from ER. Finally, we emphasize that nothing on the objects and their values
have been revealed since they are all encrypted.
4.10.2 Batch Processing for SecQuery
In the query processing SecQuery, we observe that we do not need to run the protocols
SecDupElim and EncSort for every depth. Since SecDupElim and EncSort are the most costly
protocols in SecQuery, we can perform batch processing and execute them after a few depths
and not at each depth. Our observation is that there is no need to deduplicate repeated
objects at each scanned depth. If we perform the SecDupElim after certain depths of
scanning, then the repeated objects will be eliminated, and those distinct encrypted objects
with updated worst and best scores will be sorted by running EncSort. The protocol will
remain correct. We introduce a parameter p such that p ≥ k. The parameter p specifies
where we need to run the SecDupElim and EncSort in the SecQuery protocol. That is,
the server S1 runs the SecQuery with S2 the same as in Algorithm 8, except that every p
depths we run line 9-12 in Algorithm 8 to check if the algorithm could halt. In addition, we
can replace the SecDupElim with the original SecDedup in the batch processing for better
privacy but at the cost of some efficiency.
Security. Compared to the optimization from SecDupElim, we show that the batching
strategy provides more privacy than just running the SecDupElim alone. For query q,
assuming that we compute the scores over m attributes. Recall that the UPp(q) at depth
p has been revealed to S1 while running SecDupElim, therefore, after the first depth, in the
worst case, S1 learns that the objects at the first depth is the same object. To prevent
this worst case leakage, we perform SecDupElim every p depth. Then S1 learns there are p
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distinct objects in the worst case. After depth p, the probability that S1 can correctly locate
those distinct encrypted objects’ positions in the table is at most 1(p!)m . This decreases fast
for bigger p. However, in practice this leakage is very small as many distinct objects
appear every p depth. Similar to all our protocols, the encryptions are fresh due to the
‘re-encryption’ by the server. Even though S1 has some probability of guessing the distinct
objects’ location, the object id and their scores have not been revealed since they are all
encrypted.
4.10.3 Efficiency
We analyze the efficiency of query execution. Suppose the client chooses m attributes for
the query, therefore at each depth there are m objects. At depth d, it takes S1 O(m)
for executing SecWorst, O(md) for executing SecBest, O(m2) for SecDedup, and O(m2d)
for the SecUpdate. The complexities for S2 are similar. In addition, the EncSort has
time overhead O(m log2m); however, we can further reduce to O(log2m) by adapting
parallelism (see [Baldimtsi and Ohrimenko, 2014]). On the other hand, the SecDupElim
only takes O(u2), where u is the number of distinct objects at this depth. Notice that
most of the computations are multiplication (homomorphic addition), therefore, the cost
of query processing is relatively small.
4.11 Experiments
To evaluate the performance of our protocols, we conducted a set of experiments using
real and synthetic datasets. We used HMAC-SHA-256 as the pseudo-random function
(PRF) for the EHL and EHL+ encoding, 512-bit security for the Paillier and DJ encryption
schemes, and all experiments are implemented using C++. We implement the scheme
SecTopK = (Enc,Token, SecQuery), including all the protocols SecWorst, SecBest, EncSort,
and EncCompare and their optimizations. For the server S1, we run our experiments on a
24 core machine, that serves as the cloud, running Scientific Linux with 128GB memory
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Figure 4.4: Encryption using EHL vs. EHL+.
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Figure 4.5: Encryption EHL vs. EHL+ on real data
and 2.9GHz Intel Xeon. For the server S2, we used a 9 core machine, running Scientific
Linux with 64GB RAM and 3.4GHz Intel Xeon.
Data Sets We use the following real world datasets from UCI Machine Learning Repos-
itory [Lichman, 2013]. insurance: a benchmark dataset that contains 5822 customers’
information from an insurance company and we extracted 13 attributes from the original
dataset. diabetes: a patients dataset containing 101767 patients’ records (i.e. data ob-
jects), where we extracted 10 attributes. PAMAP: a physical activity monitoring dataset that
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contains 376416 objects, from which we extracted 15 attributes. We also generated syn-
thetic datasets synthetic with 10 attributes that take values from a Gaussian distribution
and the number of records are varied between 5 thousand to 1 million.
4.11.1 Evaluation of the Encryption Setup
We implemented both the EHL and the efficient EHL+. For EHL, to minimize the false
positives, we set the parameters as H = 23 and s = 5, where L is the size of the EHL
and s is the number of secure hash functions. For EHL+, we choose the number of secure
hash function HMAC in EHL+ to be s = 5, and, as discussed in the previous section, we
obtained negligible false positive rate in practice. The encryption Enc is independent
of the characteristics of the dataset and depends only on the size. Thus, we generated
datasets such that the number of the objects range from 0.1 to 1 million. We compare the
encryptions using EHL and EHL+. After sorting the scores for each attribute, the encryption
for each item can be fully parallelized. Therefore, when encrypting each dataset, we used
64 threads on the machine that we discussed before. Figure 4.4 shows that, both in terms
of time and space, the cost of database encryption Enc is reasonable and scales linearly with
the size of the database. Clearly, EHL+ has less time and space overhead. For example, it
only takes 54 seconds to encrypt 1 million records using EHL+. The size is also reasonable,
as the encrypted database only takes 111 MB using EHL+. Figure 4.5 also shows the
encryption time and size overhead for the real dataset that we used. Finally, we emphasize
that the encryption only incurs a one-time off-line construction overhead.
4.11.2 Query Processing Performance
4.11.2.1 Query Performance and Methodology
We evaluate the performance of the secure query processing and their optimizations that
we discussed before. In particular, we use the query algorithm without any optimization
but with full privacy, denoted as Qry F; the query algorithm running SecDupElim instead
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of SecDedup at every depth, denoted as Qry E; and the one using the batching strategies,
denoted as Qry Ba. We evaluate the query processing performance using all the datasets
and use EHL+ to encrypt all of the object ids.
Notice that the performance of the NRA algorithm depends on the distribution of the
dataset among other things. Therefore, to present a clear and simple comparison of the
different methods, we measure the average time per depth for the query processing, i.e.
T
D , where T is the total time that the program spends on executing a query and D is the
total number of depths the program scanned before halting. In most of our experiments
the value of D ranges between a few hundred and a few thousands. For each query, we
randomly choose the number of attributes m that are used for the ranking function ranging
from 2 to 8, and we also vary k between 2 and 20. The ranking function F that we use is
the sum function.
4.11.2.2 Qry F evaluation
We report the query processing performance without any query optimization. Figure 4.6
shows Qry F query performance. The results are very promising considering that the query
is executed completely on encrypted data. For a fixed number of attributes m = 3, the
average time is about 1.30 seconds for the largest dataset synthetic running top-20 queries.
When fixing k = 5, the average time per depth for all the dataset is below 1.20 seconds.
As we can see, for fixed m, the performance scales linearly as k increases. Similarly, the
query time also linearly increases as m gets larger for fixed k.
4.11.2.3 Qry E evaluation
The experiments show that the SecDupElim improves the efficiency of the query processing.
Figure 4.7 shows the querying overhead for exactly the same setting as before. Since Qry E
eliminates all the duplicated the items for each depth, Qry E has been improved compared
to the Qry F above. As k increases, the performance for Qry E executes up to 5 times faster
than Qry F when k increase to 20. On the other hand, fixing k = 5, the performance of
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Figure 4.6: Qry F query performance
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
2 4 6 8 10 15 20
tim
e 
pe
r d
ep
th
 (s
ec
.)
k
diabetes m=3
insurance m=3
pama m=3
syn. m=3
(a) Performance varying k
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 2  3  4  5  6  7  8
tim
e 
pe
r d
ep
th
 (s
ec
.)
m
diabetes k=5
insurance k=5
pama k=5
syn. k=5
(b) Performance varying m
Figure 4.7: Qry E query optimization performance
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Qry E can execute up to around 7 times faster than Qry F as m grows to 20. In general,
the experiments show that Qry E effectively speeds up the query time 5 to 7 times over the
basic approach.
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Figure 4.8: Qry Ba query optimization performance
4.11.2.4 Qry Ba evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of batching optimization for the Qry Ba queries. Figure 4.8
shows the query performance of the Qry Ba for the same settings as the previous exper-
iments. The experiments show that the batching technique further improves the perfor-
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Figure 4.9: Comparisons (k = 5, m = 2, and p = 500)
mance. In particular, for fixed batching parameter p = 150, i.e. every 150 depths we
perform SecDupElim and EncSort in the SecQuery, and we vary our k from 2 to 20. Com-
pared to the Qry E, the average time per depth for all of the datasets have been further
improved. For example, when k = 2, the average time for the largest dataset synthetic
is reduced to 74.5 milliseconds, while for Qry F it takes more than 500 milliseconds . For
diabetes, the average time is reduced to 53 milliseconds when k = 2 and 123.5 millisec-
onds when k increases to 20. As shown in figure 4.8a, the average time linearly increases
as k gets larger. Similarly, when fixing the k = 5 and p = 150, for synthetic the per-
formance per depth reduce to 61.1 milliseconds and 92.5 milliseconds when m = 2 and 8
separately. In Figure 4.8c, We further evaluate the parameter p. Ranging p from 200 to
550, the experiments show that the proper p can be chosen for better query performance.
For example, the performance for diabetes achieves the best when p = 450. In general,
for different dataset, there are different p’s that can achieve the best query performance.
When p gets larger, the number of calls for EncSort and SecDupElim are reduced, however,
the performance for these two protocols also slow down as there’re more encrypted items.
We finally compare the three queries’ performance. Figure 4.9 shows the query perfor-
mance when fixing k = 5, m = 3, and p = 500. Clearly, as we can see, Qry Ba significantly
improves the performance compared to Qry F. For example, compared to Qry F, the aver-
age running time is roughly 15 times faster for PAMAP.
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4.11.2.5 Communication Bandwidth
Finally we show the experiments on the communication bandwidth and latency. Our
experiments show that the network latency is significantly less than the query computation
cost. We evaluate the communication on the fully secure and un-optimized Qry Ba queries.
Note that, for each depth, the bandwidth is the same since the duplicated encrypted objects
are filled with encryptions of random values.
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Figure 4.10: Communication bandwidth evaluation
We evaluate the bandwidth on the largest dataset synthetic. Note that, the bandwidth
per depth is independent of k since each depth this communication size only depends on
m. As mentioned the bandwidth is O(m2), by varying m we show in Figure 4.10a the
bandwidth per depth. In Figure 4.10b, we show the total bandwidth when executing the
top-20 by fixing m = 4. As we can see, the total size of the bandwidth is very small,
therefore, the total latency could be very small for a high-speed connection between the
two clouds. By assuming a standard 50 Mbps LAN setting, we show in the table 4.3 below
the total network latency between the servers S1 and S2 when k = 20 and m = 4.
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dataset total bandwidth (MB) total network latency (in seconds)
insurance 8.87 1.41
diabetes 12.45 1.99
PAMAP 15.72 2.5152
synthetic 17.3 2.768
Table 4.3: Total Communication Network Latency for each dataset when k = 20, m = 4
The top-20 can be reported for all the dataset after a few thousands depth. Therefore,
the average latency for each depth on every dataset is less than 1ms, which is significantly
less than the query processing cost. Similar conclusions can be drawn for other parameter
settings.
4.12 Top-k Join
We would like to briefly mention that our technique can be also extended to compute top-k
join queries over multiple encrypted relations. Given a set of relations, R1, . . . , RL, each
tuple in Ri is associated with some score that gives it a rank within Ri. The top-k join
query joins R1 to RL and produces the results ranked on a total score. The total score
is computed according to some function, F , that combines individual scores. We consider
only (i.e.equi-join) conditions in this paper. Similarly, the score function F we consider
in this paper is also a linear combination over the attributes from the joining relations.
A possible SQL-like join query example is as follows: Q1 = SELECT * FROM A,B,C WHERE
A.1=B.1 and B.2=C.3 ORDER BY A.1+B.2+C.4 STOP AFTER k; where A, B and C are
three relations and A.1, B.1, B.2, C.3, C.4 are attributes on these relations. Our idea
is to design a secure join operator, denoted as ./sec, such that the server S1 obliviously
joins the relations based on the received token. S1 has to invoke a protocol with S2 to get
the resulting joined results that meet the join condition.
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4.12.1 Secure Top-k Join
We provide a description of the secure top-k join in this section. Since a join operator is
implemented in most system as a dyadic (2-way) operator, we describe the secure top-k
operator as a binary join operator between two relations R1 and R2. Consider an authorized
client that wants to join two encrypted relations and get the top-k based on a join condition.
Assume that each tuple in Ri has mi many attributes and each Ri have ni many tuples
for i = {1, 2}. Furthermore, denote oij be the jth objects in Ri and let oij .xk be the kth
attribute value.
4.12.2 Encryption Setup for Multiple databases
Algorithm 15: Enc(R1, R2): database encryption
1 Generate public/secret key pkp, skp for the pailliar encryption, generate random
secret keys κ1, . . . , κs for the EHL;
2 foreach each oij ∈ Ri do
3 foreach each attribute oij .xk do
4 set E(sk)← 〈EHL(oij .xk),Enc(oij .xk)〉;
5 set E(oij) =
(
E(s1), ..., E(smi)
)
6 Generate a key K for the PRP P ;
7 Permutes the encrypted attributes based on P , i.e. set
E(oij) =
(
E(sPK(1)), ..., E(sPK(mi))
)
;
8 Output permuted encrypted databases as ER1 = {E(o11)...E(o1n1)} and
ER2 = {E(o21)...E(o2n2)};
Consider a set of relations R1 and R2. The encryption setup is similar as the top-
k for one relation. The difference is that since we have multiple relations on different
data we cannot assign a global object identifier for each the objects in different relations.
The difference here is that, in addition to encrypting an object id with EHL, we encrypt
the attribute value using EHL since the join condition generated from the client is to
join the relations based on the attribute values. Therefore, we can compare the equality
between different records based on their attributes. The encryption Enc(R1, R2) is given
in Algorithm 15.
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The encrypted relations ER1,ER2 do not reveal anything besides the size. The proof is
similar to the proof in Theorem 4.6.1.
4.12.3 Query Token
Consider a client that wants to run query a SQL-like top-k join as follows: Q = SELECT
* FROM R1, R2 WHERE R1.A = R2.B ORDER BY R1.C + R1.D STOP AFTER k; where A, C are
attributes in R1 and B, D are attributes in R2. The client first requests the key K for the
P , then computes (t1, t2, t3, t4) ← (PK(R1.A), PK(R2.B), PK(R1.C), PK(R2.D)). Finally,
the client generates the SQL-like query token as follows: tQ = SELECT * FROM ER1,ER2
WHERE ER1.t1 = ER2.t2 ORDERED BY ER1.t3 + ER2.t4 STOP AFTER k. Then, the client
sends the token tQ to the server S1.
4.12.4 Query Processing for top-k join
In this section, we introduce the secure top-k join operator ./sec. We first introduce some
notation that we use in the query processing algorithm. For a receiving token tQ that is
described in Section 4.12.4, let the join condition be JC
def
:=
(
ER1.t1= ER2.t2
)
, and the score
function Score = ER1.t3 + ER4.t4. Moreover, for each E(o
1
i ) ∈ ER1, let E(xit1) and E(xit3)
be the t1-th and t3-th encrypted attribute. Similarly, let E(xjt2) and E(xjt4) be the t2-th
and t4-th encrypted attribute for each E(o
2
j ) in ER2. In addition, let E(X) be a vector
of encryptions, i.e. E(X) = 〈Enc(x1), ...,Enc(xs)〉, and let E(R) = 〈(Enc(r1), ...,Enc(rs))〉,
where R ∈ ZsN with each ri $←− ZN . Denote the randomization function Rand as below:
Rand(E(X),E(R)) = (Enc(x1) · Enc(r1), ...,Enc(xn) · Enc(rn))
= (Enc(x1 + r1), ...,Enc(xn + rn))
. This function is similar to Rand in Algorithm 12 and is used to homomorphically blind
the original value.
In general, the procedure for query processing includes the following steps:
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Algorithm 16: SecJoin(tk, pkp, skp): ./sec with JC = (ER1.t1,ER2.t2) and Score =
ER1.t3 + ER2.t4
S1’s input: pkp, tk
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Parse tk, let JC = (ER1.t1,ER2.t2) and Score = ER1.t3 + ER2.t4
3 foreach E(o1i ) ∈ ER1, E(o2j ) ∈ ER2 in random order do
4 Let E(o1i ) =
(
E(xi1), ...E(xim1)
)
and E(o2j ) =
(
E(xj1), ...E(xjm2)
)
;
5 Compute Enc(bij)← EHL(xit1)	 EHL(xjt2), where E(xit1), E(xjt2) are the
t1-th, t2-th attributes in E(o
1
i ), E(o
2
j );
/* evaluate sij = bij(xit3 + xjt4) */
6 Send Enc(bij) to S2 and receive E
2
(
tij
)
from S2;
7 Compute Score as: sij ← E2
(
bij
)Enc(xit3 )Enc(xjt4 );
8 run Enc(sij)← RecoverEnc(Sij , pkp, skp).
9 Combine rest of the attributes for E(oij) as follows: xl ← E2
(
bij
)Enc(xl),
where Enc(xl) ∈ {Enc(xi1)...Enc(xjm2)} in E(O1i ), E(O2j );
10 Run Enc(xl)← RecoverEnc(xl, pkp, skp).
11 Server S2:
12 For each received tij , decrypts it. If it is 0, then compute bij ← E2
(
1
)
.
Otherwise, bij ← E2
(
0
)
. Sends bij to S1.
13 Server S1:
14 Finally holds joined encrypted tuples E(oij) = Enc(sij), {Enc(xl)}, where
Enc(sij) is the encrypted Score, {Enc(xl)} are the joined attributes from
ER1,ER2.
15 Run L← SecFilter({E(oij), pkp, skp}) and get the encrypted list L.
16 Run EncSort to conduct encrypted sort on encrypted Score Enc(sij), and return
top-k encrypted items.
• Perform the join on ER1 and ER2.
– Receiving the token, S1 runs the protocol with S2 to generate all possible joined
tuples from two relations and homomorphically computes the encrypted scores.
– After getting all the joined tuples, S1 runs SecFilter({E(oi)}, pkp, skp) (see Algo-
rithm 17), which is a protocol with S2 to eliminate the tuples that do not meet
the join condition. S1 and S2 then runs the protocol SecJoin. S1 finally produce
the encrypted join tuples together with their scores.
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Algorithm 17: SecFilter
({E(oi)}, pkp, skp)
S1’s input: {E(oi)}, pkp
S2’s input: pkp, skp
1 Server S1:
2 Let E(oi) =
(
Enc(si),E(Xi)
)
where E(Xi) = 〈Enc(xi1), ...,Enc(xis)〉;
3 Generate a key pair (pks, sks);
4 foreach E(oi) do
5 Generate random ri ∈ Z∗N , and Ri ∈ ZmN ;
6 Enc(s′i)← Enc(si)ri and E(X ′i)← Rand(E(Xi),E(Ri));
7 Set E(o′i) =
(
Enc(s′i),E(X
′
i)
)
;
8 Compute the following: Encpks(r
−1
1 ),Encpks(R1), . . . , Encpks(r
−1
n ),Encpks(Rn);
9 Generate random permutation pi, permute E(o′pi(i)), Encpks(r
−1
pi(i)), and Encpks(Rpi(i));
10 Sends E(o′pi(i)), Encpks(r
−1
pi(i)),Encpks(Rpi(i)), and pks to S2;
11 Server S2:
12 Receiving the list E(o′pi(i)) and Encpks(rpi(i)),Encpks(Rpi(i));
13 foreach E(o′pi(i)) ∈
(
Enc(s′pi(i)),E(X
′
pi(i))
)
do
14 decrypt b← Enc(s′pi(i));
15 if b = 0 then
16 Remove this entry E(T ′pi(i)) and Encpks(r
−1
pi(i)),Encpks(Rpi(i))
17 foreach remaining items do
18 Generate random γi ∈ Z∗N , and Γi ∈ ZmN ;
19 Enc(s˜i)← Enc(s′pi(i))γi and E(X˜i)← Rand
(
E(X ′pi(i)),E(Γi)
)
;
20 Set E(o˜i) =
(
Enc(s˜i),E(X˜i)
)
;
/* evaluate r˜i = r
−1
pi(i)γ
−1
i */
21 compute the following using pks: Encpks(r˜i)← Encpks(r−1pi(i))γ
−1
i ;
/* evaluate R˜i = Rpi(i) + Γ
−1
i */
22 Encpks(R˜i)←Encpks(Rpi(i)) · Encpks(Γi)
23 Sends the E(o˜i) and Encpks(r˜i),Encpks(R˜i) to S1
24 Server S1:
25 foreach E(o˜i) = (Enc(s˜),E(X˜i)) and Encpks(r˜i),Encpks(R˜i) do
26 use sks to decrypt Enc(r˜i) as r˜i, Enc(R˜i) as R˜i;
/* homomorphically de-blind */
27 compute Enc(si)← Enc(s˜i)r˜i and E(Xi)← Rand(E(X˜i),E(−R˜i));
28 Set E(o′i) = (Enc(si),E(Xi));
/* Suppose there’re l tuples left */
29 Output the list E(o′1) ... E(o
′
l).
• EncSort: after securely joining all the databases, S1 then runs the encrypted sorting
protocol to get the top-k results.
The main ./sec is fully described in Algorithm 16. As mentioned earlier, since all the
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attributes are encrypted, we cannot simply use the traditional join strategy. The merge-
sort or hash based join cannot be applied here since all the tuples have been encrypted
by a probabilistic encryption. Our idea for S1 to securely produce the joined result is as
follows: S1 first combines all the tuples from two databases (say, using nested loop) by
initiating the protocol SecJoin. After that, S1 holds all the combined tuples together with
the scores. The joined tuple have m1 + m2 many attributes (or user selected attributes).
Those tuples that meet the equi-join condition JC are successfully joined together with the
encrypted scores that satisfy the Score function. However, for those tuples that do not
meet the JC, their encrypted scores are homomorphically computed as Enc(0) and their
joined attributes are all Enc(0) as well. S1 holds all the possible combined tuples. Next,
the SecFilter eliminates all of those tuples that do not satisfy JC. It is easy to see that
similar techniques from SecDupElim can be applied here. At the end of the protocol, both
S1 and S2 only learn the final number of the joined tuples that meet JC.
Below we describe the SecJoin and SecFilter protocols in detail. Receiving the Token,
S1 first parses it as the join condition JC = (ER1.t1, ER2.t2), and the score function Score =
ER1.t3+ER2.t4. Then for each encrypted objects E(o1i) ∈ ER1 and E(o2i) ∈ ER2 in random
order S1 computes tij ←
(
EHL(xit1)	 EHL(xjt2)
)rij , where xit1 and xjt2 are the value for
the t1th and t2th attribute for E(o1i) and E(o2j) separately. rij is randomly generated
value in Z∗N , then S1 sends tij to S2. Having the decryption key, S2 decrypts it to bij ,
which indicates whether the encrypted value xit1 and xjt2 are equal or not. If bij = 0,
then we have xit1 = xjt2 which meets the join condition JC. Otherwise, bij is a random
value. S2 then encrypts the bit bij using a double layered encryption and sends it to S1,
where bij = 0 if xit1 6= xjt2 otherwise bij = 1. Receiving the encryption, S1 computes
Sij ← E2
(
bij
)Enc(x1t3 )Enc(x2t4 ), where x1t3 is the t3-th attribute for E(o1i) and x2t4 is the t4-
th attribute for E(o2j). Finally, S1 runs the StripEnc to get the normal encryption Enc(sij).
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Based on the construction,
Enc(sij) ∼ Enc
(
bij(x1t3 + x2t4)
)
, where bij =

1 if x1t1 = x2t2
0 otherwise
Finally, after fully combining the encrypted tuples, S1 holds the joined encrypted
tuple as well as the encrypted scores, i.e. E(T ) = (Enc(sij), Enc(x11)...Enc(x1m1),
Enc(x21), ...,Enc(x2m2)). During the execution above, nothing has been revealed to S1,
S2 only learns the number of tuples meets the join condition JC but does not which pairs
since the S1 sends out the encrypted values in random order. Also, notice that S1 can only
select interested attributes from ER1 and ER2 when combining the encrypted tuples. Here
we describe the protocol in general.
After SecJoin, assume S1 holds n combined the tuples with each tuple has m combined
attributes, then for each of tuple E(Ti) = (Enc(si),E(Xi)), where E(Xi) is the combined
encrypted attributes E(Xi) = 〈Enc(xi1), ...Enc(xim)〉. Next, S1 tries to blind encryptions
in order to prevent S2 from knowing the actual value. For each E(Ti), S1 generates random
ri ∈ Z∗N and Ri ∈ ZNm, and blinds the encryption by computing following: Enc(s′i) ←
Enc(si)
ri and E(X ′i) ← Rand(E(Xi),E(Ri)). Then S1 sets E(T ′i ) =
(
Enc(s′i),Enc(X
′
i)
)
.
Furthermore, S1 generates a new key pair for the paillier encryption scheme (pks, sks) and
encrypts the following: L = Enc(r−11 )pks ,Enc(R1)pks , . . . ,Enc(r
−1
n )pks ,Enc(Rn)pks , where
each r−1i is the inverse of ri in the group ZN . S1 needs to encrypt the randomnesses in
order to recover the original values, and we will explain this later. Moreover, S1 generates
a random permutation pi, then permutes E(Tpi(i)) and Enc(r
−1
pi(i))pks ,Enc(Rpi(i))pks for i =
[1, n]. S1 sends the permuted encryptions to S2.
S2 receives all the encryptions. For each received E(T
′
pi(i)) = (Enc(s
′
pi(i)),E(X
′
pi(i))),
S2 decrypts Enc(s
′
pi(i)), if s
′
pi(i) is 0 then S2 removes tuple E(T
′
pi(i)) and corresponding
Enc(r−1pi(i))pks , Enc(Rpi(i))pks . For the remaining tuples E(Tpi(i)), S2 generates random
r′i ∈ Z∗N , and R′i ∈ ZmN , and compute the following Enc(s˜i) ← Enc(s′pi(i))r
′
i , Enc(X˜i) ←
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Rand
(
E(X ′pi(i)),E(R
′
i)
)
(see Algorithm 16 line 19). Then set E(T˜i) =
(
Enc(s˜i),Enc(X˜i)
)
Note that, this step prevents the S1 from knowing which tuples have been removed. Also,
in order to let S1 recover the original values, S2 encrypts and compute the following us-
ing pks, Enc(r˜i) ← Enc(r−1pi(i))
r′i
−1
pks
and Enc(R˜i) ←Enc(R′pi(i))pks · Enc(R′i)pks . Finally, S1
sends the E(T˜i) and Enc(r˜i),Enc(R˜i) to S1. Assuming there’re n
′ joined tuples left. On
the other side, S1 receives the encrypted tuples, for each E(T˜i) = Enc(s˜),Enc(X˜i) and
Enc(r˜i),Enc(R˜i), S1 recovers the original values by computing the following: compute
Enc(s′i) ← Enc(s˜i)r˜i and E(X ′i) ← Rand(E(X˜i),E(−R˜i)). Notice that, for the remaining
encrypted tuples and their encrypted scores, S1 can successfully recover the original value,
we show below that the encrypted scores Enc(sj) is indeed some permuted Enc(spi(i)):
Enc(sj) ∼ Enc(r˜j · s˜j) (see Alg. 16 line 28)
∼ Enc(r−1pi(j)r′−1j · s˜j) (see Alg. 16 line 22)
∼ Enc(r−1pi(j)r′−1j · s′pi(j) · r′j) (see Alg. 16 line 19)
∼ Enc(r−1pi(j)r′−1j · spi(j)rpi(j)r′j) (see Alg. 16 line 6,10)
∼ Enc(spi(j))
If we don’t want to leak the number of tuples that meet JC, we can use a similar
technique from SecDedup, that is, S2 generates some random tuples and large enough
random scores for the tuples to not satisfy JC. In this way, nothing else has been leaked
to the servers. It is worth noting that the technique sketched above not only can be used
for top-k join, but for any equality join can be applied here.
4.12.4.1 Performance Evaluation
We conduct the experiments under the same environment as in Section 4.11. We use
synthetic datasets to evaluate our sec-join operator ./sec: we uniformly generate R1 with
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5K tuples and 10 attributes, and R2 with 10K tuples and 15 attributes. Since the server
runs the oblivious join that we discuss before over the encrypted databases, the performance
of the ./sec does not depend on the parameter k. We test the effect of the joined attributes
in the experiments. We vary the total number of the attribute m joined together from two
tables. Figure 4.11 shows performance when m ranges from 5 to 20.
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Figure 4.11: Top-k join: ./sec
Our operator ./sec is generically designed for joining any attributes between two rela-
tions. In practice, one would be only interested in joining two tables using primary-key-to-
foreign-key join or foreign-key-to-primary-key join. Our methods can be easily generalized
to those joins. In addition, one can also pre-sort the attributes to be ranked and save
computations in the ./sec processing. We leave this as the future work of this thesis.
4.12.5 Related works on Secure Join
Many works have proposed for executing equi-joins over encrypted data. One recent
work [Pang and Ding, 2014] proposed a privacy-preserving join on encrypted data. Their
work mainly designed for the private join operation, therefore cannot support the top-
k join. In addition, in [Pang and Ding, 2014], although the actual values for the joined
records are not revealed, the server learns some equality pattern on the attributes if
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records are successfully joined. In addition, [Pang and Ding, 2014] uses bilinear pairing
during their query processing, thus it might cause high computation overhead for large
datasets. CryptDB [Popa et al., 2011] is a well-known system for processing queries on
encrypted data. MONOMI [Tu et al., 2013] is based on CryptDB with a special focus on
efficient analytical query processing. [Kerschbaum et al., 2013] adapts the deterministic
proxy re-encryption to provide the data confidentiality. The approaches using determin-
istic encryption directly leak the duplicates and, as a result, the equality patterns to the
adversarial servers. [Wong et al., 2014] propose a secure query system SDB that protects
the data confidentiality by decomposing the sensitive data into shares and can perform
secure joins on shares of the data. However, it is unclear whether the system can perform
top-k queries over the shares of the data. Other solutions such as Order-preserving encryp-
tion (OPE) [Boldyreva et al., 2011b, Agrawal et al., 2004] can also be adapted to secure
top-k join, however, it is commonly not considered very secure on protecting the ranks of
the score as the adversarial server directly learns the order of the attributes.
4.13 Top-k Query Processing Conclusion
This paper proposes the first complete scheme that executes top-k ranking queries over
encrypted databases in the cloud. First, we describe a secure probabilistic data structure
called encrypted hash list (EHL) that allows a cloud server to homomorphically check
equality between two objects without learning anything about the original objects. Then,
by adapting the well-known NRA algorithm, we propose a number of secure protocols
that allow efficient top-k queries execution over encrypted data. The protocols proposed
can securely compute the best/worst ranking scores and de-duplication of the replicated
objects. Moreover, the protocols in this paper are stand-alone which means the protocols
can be used for other applications besides the secure top-k query problem. The scheme is
experimentally evaluated using real-world data sets which show the scheme is efficient and
practical.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Ensuring security and privacy is becoming a significant challenge for cloud computing,
especially for users with sensitive and valuable data. This thesis focus on the develop-
ment of privacy-enhancing technologies that minimize the amount of data being revealed
when outsourcing massive datasets in cloud-based environments. In particular, this thesis
investigates several practical and provably secure encryption schemes that allow the data
owner to encrypting large-scale databases without losing the ability to query and retrieve
it efficiently for authorized clients.
In this dissertation, we have formalized and proposed the graph encryption framework
for graph databases. The graph encryption is to encrypt graph data in such a way that they
can be privately queried. In particular, in Chapter 3, this thesis proposes a graph encryp-
tion scheme for approximate shortest distance queries, called GRECS. Such scheme allows
the client to query the shortest distance between two nodes in an encrypted graph. The
GRECS system consists of three different schemes and can support approximated shortest
distance queries. By leveraging distance oracle structures, we present several encryption
schemes with different trade-offs. These encryption schemes do not affect the distance
approximation of the underlying distance oracles, and, at the same time, provide strong
security guarantees based on the formal security definition from graph encryption. The
first scheme is computationally efficient, while the second one is communication-efficient
by adopting specialized homomorphic encryption schemes. This thesis also propose a third
scheme which is both computational and communication-efficient but leaks some small
amount of controlled information. The experimental results of using the encryption scheme
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on many real world graph datasets are very promising. It demonstrates that the construc-
tions are extremely efficient and scalable compared to state-of-the-art solutions. In fact,
in most cases, GRECS can report better approximations than the original distance oracle,
which makes the accuracy of the shortest distance quite high. For example, for 10,000
randomly generated queries, roughly 50% of the distances returned are the true shortest
distances. Moreover, this thesis also explores how the techniques can be applied to other
graph queries.
In Chapter 4, this thesis presents a secure top-k query processing protocol on encrypted
databases under the non-colluding semi-honest clouds model. The thesis also has formu-
lated and presented several novel secure sub-protocols, such as secure best/worst score and
secure de-duplication, which can be adapted as stand-alone building blocks for many other
applications. Furthermore, we extend the techniques to support secure top-k join queries
over multiple encrypted databases. The results show that the protocol is extremely efficient
and has very low computational overhead. Moreover, this dissertation presents the secure
protocol for handling general secure join queries. The proposed scheme also improves the
security of other existing works which adopt some less secure property-preserving encryp-
tions. This thesis has evaluated schemes by implementing the proposed protocols and
running a set of experiments on a number of real-world databases.
5.1 Future Directions
This dissertation so far has taken preliminary steps to dealing with some of the security
and privacy issues that arise in databases and data mining. Nevertheless, in the future
there are a number of fascinating open problems in the area that need to be addressed on
how to provide large-scale data security and privacy in cloud computing. Some compelling
problems that come to mind include:
Privacy-preserving Machine Learning One goal is to design a practical privacy-
preserving machine learning system that enables machine learning algorithms to run on
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encrypted data. Recently, a number of applied security and privacy research problems
have appeared in data mining and machine learning. For example, in the cloud-based
environment, a user with sensitive data wants to make an inference using a machine learn-
ing predictive model that is held by the cloud, without compromising the user’s private
information. To protect data confidentiality, the user encrypts the data and sends the
ciphertexts to the cloud who runs the machine learning algorithm over the encrypted
data. Existing solutions are mainly focused on specific machine learning models and rely
on some high-degree homomorphic encryptions with extremely high performance overhead.
However, by taking advantage of the structures of the original dataset, one can have an effi-
cient structured encryption scheme for some algorithms running on specific data structures.
Having many such encryption schemes as building blocks can result in a more efficient and
more secure system. The goal would be to have a generic and modular approach that can
combine those structured encryption schemes for machine learning tasks.
Verifiable Computation on Encrypted Databases This thesis mainly addresses the
problem of providing strong privacy under semi-honest adversarial model. In the future,
it will be compelling to explore the possibility of bringing verifiable computation to both
structured and graph encryptions. A number of works have shown some preliminary results
of designing verifiable computation for some particular homomorphic encryption schemes.
However, these theoretical results are very inefficient and are very hard to apply to database
and data mining applications. A future direction is to combine the techniques of searchable
and graph encryption with the techniques used in verifiable computation. A long-term goal
would be to have a practical verifiable encryption scheme for massive datasets that provides
both data privacy and integrity, without losing the capability to query the datasets.
Leakage Mitigation The protocols given in this thesis come with certain leakages. An-
other direction is to explore techniques to further reduce leakage in privacy-preserving
database systems and mitigate inference attacks on those systems. In addition, we still
103
don’t know if there are any better ways of expressing the semantic meanings of leakage
and quantifying the amount of leakage when querying encrypted databases. We have seen
many proposed works on supporting rich SQL queries on encrypted databases by leveraging
property-preserving encryptions. Those approaches have much weaker security guarantees.
Resolving this issue seems a promising future direction.
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